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ABSTRACT
The twenty-first century, marked by neoliberalism and suspicious, visibly violent far-Right
politics, has presented new challenges to critical and literary theorists. In response, some
theorists advocate for a postcritical turn, challenging both the surface/depth picture of language
and the privileged status of suspicion in interpretation in order to explore alternative pictures of
language and reading that can better address the challenges of our own day. In this thesis, I
connect one of these alternatives, Toril Moi’s use of Ordinary Language Philosophy in literary
studies, to Wendell Berry’s prioritization of place in environmentalist activism. In connecting
these two thinkers, I contend for ordinary placed reading, or a practice of reading that interprets
literature according to the way it intervenes in the critic’s own place of residence, in the natural,
social, and agricultural realms. I then analyze Berry’s novel Jayber Crow in order to illustrate
how his protagonist, Jayber, exemplifies this mode of reading in his shift from displaced,
suspicious reader to a reader embedded in his place and interpreting historical and technological
developments according to its consequences for his placed community.
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POSTCRITIQUE AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY LITERARY STUDIES

Wendell Berry prefaces his novel Jayber Crow (2000) with a posted notice, in a format
familiar to anyone who has wandered to a property line while out in the country:
NOTICE
Persons attempting to find a “text” in this book will be prosecuted; persons attempting to
find a “subtext” will be banished; persons attempting to explain, interpret, explicate,
analyze, deconstruct, or otherwise “understand” it will be exiled to a desert island in the
company only of other explainers.
BY ORDER OF THE AUTHOR.
For literary theorists and critics, this notice, reminiscent of Twain’s in Huckleberry Finn, is
rather abrasive, even cruel. After all, the various acts that Berry bans in his novel are,
conventionally, the tools of our trade, the tasks which English departments expect of many
faculty members. How should literary critics, as professional readers, receive this warning? One
could, of course, interpret this notice as an obstinate author refusing to accept the
poststructuralist-imposed death of the author, demanding that his genius intentions be sought,
described, and admired. Alternatively, one might take the notice as the demands of a paranoid
conservative, a hostile insistence on a commonsense reading–“just read the book! This is what it
obviously means.” Interpreting his warning in either of these ways leaves critical readers with
two options. We might laugh at such an author for his futility in delaying his inevitable death and
join the mob of poststructuralists closing in around him as Roland Barthes writes his eulogy. Or
we might shake our heads as we pass by, casting a wide berth around his work, instead devoting
our energies to less hostile and regressive authors and texts.
However, for those engaging with Berry’s work, neither of these readings really do
justice to Berry’s writing. As I hope to demonstrate in the course of my analysis, while Berry is
antagonistic towards many aspects of neoliberal, industrial and technocapitalist ideology and
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praxis, he is far from hostile and paranoid, instead taking a generous and hopeful stance towards
those beholden to the ideologies he critiques. He is in many ways a traditionalist, yet he is hardly
regressive or complicit in an uncritical common sense. He seems little interested in a deathdefying, immortal status as “author,” claiming that all he is doing as a writer is “arranging the
words on the pages,” espousing ideas which “came to [him] freely” and which he
“give[s]...freely away”; to Berry, the insistence on owning ideas makes writers “thieves” (Sex,
Economy, Freedom, and Community xviii). His notice, then, might best be read less as a negation
and more as an invitation: taking the order seriously and being disarmed of their usual affective
positions and critical strategies, critical theorists and other readers might instead become open to
new affective and strategic modes of reading beyond suspicious, antagonistic affects. Readers are
bid to reconsider how one can read and, after recognizing the array of affective positions one can
take towards literature and culture, to reconsider how one should approach and read the novel
that lies beyond the notice.

How One Can Read: A Brief Survey of Hermeneutical Schools
In the early part of the twenty-first century, primarily from the late 2000s to the present,
critical theorists have begun to describe both the history and the features of critical theory and
literary/cultural criticism (“critique”), hoping to demonstrate the key tenets underlying all that
critics call critique and the ubiquity of these tenets, as well as exploring other possibilities for
doing critique in the twenty-first century. These theorists demonstrate how, despite the variety of
theories–structuralism/poststructuralism, Marxist “symptomatic reading,” Freudian analysis,
Foucauldian and Greenblattian historicism, and the many descendants and intersections of these–
critics typical, even hegemonically, share suspicion in common (Felski, “Suspicious Minds”
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217). This “hermeneutics of suspicion,” as Paul Ricœur termed this common stance towards
language, developed over the latter half of the twentieth century into an influential, in some
spheres nearly hegemonic, critical orientation towards texts among critics, despite whatever
theoretical positions or propositions they hold and over which they disagree. Yet many
contemporary postcritical theorists in the early twenty-first century have begun to question the
disproportionate influence of suspicion in critical theory.
In Freud and Philosophy, Ricœur describes what he sees as two major schools of
hermeneutics. The first, generally pre-modern and early modern school he terms the
“Hermeneutics of Recollection,” or “Hermeneutics of Trust.” This hermeneutics, holding an
affinity with (usually religious) faith, views the task of interpreting as the “restoration of
meaning” (28). The role of the interpreter is to “surrender to the movement of meaning which,
starting from the literal sense…points to something grasped in the region of the sacred” (29).
This something is the “something intended” by the sign-creator (29). The interpreter comes to
the text with “the expectation of being spoken to,” due to belief in “the fullness of language,”
where the “second [i.e., deeper] meaning somehow dwells in the first [i.e., literal] meaning” and
in the “revealing power of symbols,” where the text has a sensus plenior that the exegete can
elucidate through interpretation (29-31). This school, which Ricœur associates with the
phenomenology of religion, believes there is a depth to a text, and that that depth-meaning is
profound and, often, sublime, giving critics the role of seeking out these meanings to make
manifest the profundity of the text or cultural practice (29).
The second school, the Hermeneutics of Suspicion, developed most fully in the
nineteenth century as an antithesis to this trusting Hermeneutics of Recollection. Rita Felski,
summarizing Ricœur’s description of this school, identifies Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche as its
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primary founders–though, as she also notes, this tradition of suspicion in interpretation goes back
further to the heresy trials of the medieval ages (Felski, “Suspicious Minds” 216, 219). These
thinkers, though diverse in focus, were all united in “the conviction that appearances are
deceptive, that texts do not gracefully relinquish their meanings” (216). This legacy of suspicion
was passed on to many other influential theorists, such as Foucault, Derrida, Barthes, Lacan,
Althusser, and Jameson, until suspicion became ubiquitous in nearly every critical school
descended from these thinkers. This suspicion has spread out from revolutionary thinkers,
becoming not just a tool of Leftist ideology critique and revolution but an institutional practice in
fields like medicine and criminology (221). In this ever-expanding mood of suspicion, the
politics of revolution shifted from “affirmative or utopian projects of world-building” to a
“rhetoric of subversion, estrangement, and critique” (218). Suspicion has become so hegemonic
that there has developed “the assumption that whatever is not critical must therefore be
uncritical” (Felski, Limits 2).
In the Hermeneutics of Suspicion, the interpreter of signs or texts is called to quite a
different task than the hermeneut of recollection: instead of restoring the deeper, glorious truth of
the text, interpreters are given the task of “problematizing, interrogating and subverting,” reading
“against the grain…underscoring what it [i.e., the text] does not know and cannot understand”
(Felski, Uses 2, “Suspicious Minds” 217). The meaning of a text is “darker, more unpalatable”
than the Hermeneutics of Recollection would admit (Felski, “Suspicious Minds” 216). It is to be
found in “what it [the text] refuses to own up to” (“Suspicious Minds” 223). Whether or not there
are beautiful poetics or gripping narratives, “the most interesting aspect of a text is what it
represses” (Best and Marcus 3). To force the text to give up this meaning, the critic must be
agonistic: from a stance of “analytical detachment, critical vigilance, [and] guarded suspicion”
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(Felski, Uses 2), the interpreter engages in “an inventive piecing together of signs to create new
constellations of meaning,” as they “[fashion] a sequence of cause and effect that correlates
textual clues with underlying systems of political inequality or oppression” (“Suspicious Minds”
228, 224). Indeed, Felski reads this agonism as battle-like, seeing the Hermeneutics of Suspicion
as offering critics “the role of poachers making raids on property they do not own,” giving “a
temporary triumph over the sovereignty of authors” (“Suspicious Minds” 228). Texts try to
deceive through the deceit inherent to language, but they fail before the knowing critic
(“Suspicious Minds” 223-24). This victory in battle, the exposure of concealed ideology, is the
path to freedom and cultural transformation, making overcoming racist, sexist, homophobic,
ableist ideology possible (Best and Marcus 15; Sedgwick 140).
To fight and win this battle with the text, the reader comes to the text with an “ethos…of
againstness” and a stance of “knowingness,” a “permanent skepticism and a sharply honed
suspicion” (Felski, “Postcritical Reading” 4, Uses 4). This suspicion, Felski notes, is not merely
cognitive or intellectual but affective, “a distinctive style and sensibility” (“Suspicious Minds”
216). The suspicious mindset prefers “distance rather than closeness; guardedness rather than
openness; aggression rather than submission; [and] superiority rather than reverence” in its
affective stance towards a text, and this broad category of critique is “driven by a spirit of
disenchantment” (“Suspicious Minds” 222, 217). Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick concurs, drawing on
Melanie Klein’s concept of “position,” defined as “the characteristic posture that the ego takes
up with respect to its objects” (qtd. in Sedgwick 128). Sedgwick argues that critics primarily take
a paranoid position to the text, always showing a “painful alertness to the dangers posed” by
systems and texts around them (128). Instead of expecting to find a profound depth-meaning, as
the Hermeneutics of Trust would, readers approach a text preparing to encounter deception and
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subtle reinforcements of hegemonic ideology and institutional oppression. As an affect and
position, suspicious hermeneutics comes with “its own specific pleasures” gained from its
careful piecing together of textual clues and successfully surfacing the truth about the text
(“Suspicious Minds” 216). It is also, as Sedgwick points out, a negative affect, pain-avoidant as
much as pleasure-seeking, anticipating danger at every turn and doing whatever it takes to avoid
being surprised by what it finds (130).
This affective position remains influential across particular sociopolitical interests and
commitments in critical theory. Critics typically “diagnose” the text’s lacunae or its
misrepresentations and “allegorize” these as reflective of the world (Anker and Felski 8).
Alternatively, critics often hold a relatively restricted canon of texts that “exhibit levels of selfconsciousness mirroring their own,” championing texts that share the critic’s political
investments and level of suspicion of the systems that marginalize them (9). Many scholars, of
course, work outside of suspicious hermeneutics, with attention to texts and themes beyond those
of identity politics and oppressive power formations. Moi notes that, though these have always
existed, these are often considered outside the realm of “theory” (Revolution 99). This is either
because this research does not meet the criteria of “generality”--that is, subsuming enough
phenomena under its definitions and explanations (Revolution 99)--or because it is considered
“uncritical” or too trustful, not properly participating in the activist aims of critical theory as such
(Felski, Limits 2). These remain valuable in their realms of literary studies but are often relegated
from discussions of critical theory.
In response to this hegemony, many literary critics have begun to question whether or not
critique must stay wedded to suspicion and whether there is or should be a move into postcritical
literary theory. These scholars often cite Latour’s “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?,”

6

Sedgwick’s “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading,” and Best and Marcus’s “Surface
Reading: An Introduction” as landmark postcritical texts. While these have often set the tone for
the contentious discussions of the ongoing merits of critique and the need for postcritical
thought, Felski has been the primary architect of postcritique as a distinct school of hermeneutics
and theory. Postcritique, according to these thinkers, is primarily interested in examining the
unquestioned status of suspicion (paranoia, in Sedgwick’s terms, or symptomatic reading, for
Best and Marcus), describing what consequences suspicion has on the literary/cultural studies
field and the humanities’ relationship to the wider social and political discourses, and embracing,
rediscovering, and cultivating new ways of approaching texts that can respond to our own
sociopolitical moment.
This school of thought is not, however, a repudiation of the many gains in theory and
knowledge wrought by the Hermeneutics of Suspicion. Felski notes that the ideas found in
suspicious critical theory “still resonate individually but…no longer add up to a compelling or
comprehensive whole”—suspicion can and is still often warranted, but it does not hold up when
made the dogma of literary criticism (“After Suspicion” 33). Felski specifically targets the
dogma of suspicion in her questioning: “Why do scholars feel impelled to unmask and
demystify?...What sustains their certainty that a text is withholding some vital information, that
they must authorize their commentary by highlighting what is concealed, repressed, unsaid”
(“Suspicious Minds” 218; emphasis added)? Postcritique, then, “refers to ways of reading that
are informed by critique while pushing beyond it,” seeking diversity of affective position rather
than dogma (Felski, “Postcritical Reading” 4). As Sedgwick notes, paranoia is “one kind of
cognitive/affective theoretical practice among other, alternative kinds” (126); even the most
suspicious scholars exhibit various affects in the complex dances of reading, writing, and

7

teaching (Felski, Limits 4). Postcritique is interested in acknowledging the various affects and
strategies one might take while doing rigorous, critical reading, asking “how else might we read
if we were not ordained to read suspiciously” (Felski, “Suspicious Minds” 232)?

How Jayber Crow Has Been Read: A Survey of Jayber Crow Scholarship
Wendell Berry’s work, as his preface to Jayber Crow might suggest, has generally eluded
suspicious readings. In part, however, this is due to the relatively limited attention his fiction has
received. As Ethan Mannon has noted, Berry’s nonfiction essays, primarily on agrarianism,
rurality, and environmentalism, vastly outweigh his novels and short stories in scholarly
attention, and his fiction, when given attention, is “assign[ed]...a supporting role” to his essays’
arguments (171). This focus on his nonfiction has tended to analyze Berry’s own predominant
interests: agriculture (Fiskio; Filipiak; Kuriakose), Christianity (Burkemper and Mahan;
Christianity and Literature), and education (Meehan; Snauwaert; Schreck). Scholars who have
critiqued Berry’s fiction have similarly attended to ecological and religious themes.
Many scholars analyze the ecological and agrarian concerns of Berry’s Port William
fiction. Leaning heavily on Jayber Crow, Mannon reads the Port William narratives as
developing Berry’s thought on technology, work, and leisure. He looks at characters Burley
Coulter’s and Athey Keith’s philosophies of farm work and leisure as models, for Berry, of
sustainable work and land use (Mannon). Several scholars attend to place. Fritz Oehlschlaeger
reads Jayber Crow alongside other Port William novels, A Place on Earth and Hannah Coulter,
as “accounts of the practical peacemaking required of us…as citizens and patriots,” countering a
century of displacement and war (199). Similarly, Thomas Stanford III analyzes the realistically
imperfect but nevertheless redeemed quality of Port William, focusing on the importance of love,
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countering impersonal notions of community (Stanford). Lenka Filipova, for her part, analyzes
Berry’s promotion of fidelity to place and his opposition to displacing capitalistic forms of
agribusiness that destroy local lands and communities (Filipova).
Several scholars read Jayber Crow through theological and religious lenses. Christina
Lambert reads Jayber Crow from a blue-ecocritical and sacramental theological lens, analyzing
the role water, namely the Kentucky River that runs alongside Port William, plays as a symbol in
Berry’s earth-embracing eschatology (Lambert). Hans Gustafson similarly compares the
“sacramental spirituality” of Berry’s Port William fiction to Dostoevsky’s fiction, noting a
“panscaramentality” in Jayber Crow (356). Andrew Ronnevik also analyzes Jayber Crow’s
eschatological vision, through the mediating symbols of the Kentucky River, the church (both in
Port William and as an institution more broadly), the Port William Membership itself, and the
character Mattie Keith, concluding that, for Crow, Heaven is “hidden but present” (55).
Several scholars have read Jayber Crow, as well as Berry’s larger body of fiction,
intertextually, comparing and contrasting themes in his works with philosophers, canonized
writers, regionalists, and even his own nonfiction. Nancy Barta-Smith reads Jayber Crow against
Berry’s The Unsettling of America and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy to examine Berry’s
use of metaphors of marriage and motherhood to advocate for nurturing one’s community.
Anthony Esolen analyzes thematic and characterological convergences between Jayber Crow
and Dante’s Divine Comedy. Helen Maxson accounts for the various allusions in Jayber Crow
and other Port William fiction, recognizing allusions to the Bible, Milton, Yeats, Swift, Byron,
The Odyssey and Ulysses, and Twain, noting how these allusions “lower the boundaries between
his own work and that of his literary forebears,” connecting to and responding to the larger body
of American and Western literature (103-04). Two scholars read Berry alongside Gary Snyder
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regarding ecological and environmental concerns, comparing the writers’ “ecopoetics,” the
“interaction of their poetics and politics” (Hönnighausen 356), and their ecological ethics in
defining “the wild” (Robinson). Matt Wanat reads Berry’s short story “A Jonquil for Mary Penn”
in dialogue with Katherine Anne Porter’s “The Jilting of Granny Weatherall” for how each
addresses themes of “female isolation and connection within communities,” in which these
stories converge and conflict with one another (“From Jilting to Jonquil” 166). Wanat also
explores the connections between Berry’s fiction, Ann Pancake’s fiction, and dystopian science
fiction in their shared theme of linking the technological dissolution of placed communities and
the technological devaluation and destruction of human bodies (“Dislocation, Dismemberment,
Dystopia” 147).
Many critics place Berry in the American regionalist tradition. He is identified as a writer
carrying on the legacy of Southern short fiction writers in the tradition of Faulkner, O’Connor,
McCullers, and others (Peck). Klotter and Thompson Friend place Berry more specifically in the
tradition of Kentucky writers, arguing that Berry produces some of the most faithful literary
representations of the state (317). Katherine Ledford in her anthology of Appalachian writing
notes that, though Berry’s Kentucky River community is not strictly part of Appalachia, his
contributions to Appalachian environmentalism have made him an important thinker and author
for the region nonetheless (657).
These scholars work to place Berry’s fiction into larger trends of Western, American,
Southern/Appalachian, Christian, and environmentalist thought and literature. All of these
writers, by addressing many of the concerns most central to Berry and his fiction as well as
taking generous, reparative stances towards Berry’s work, tend towards the Hermeneutics of
Recollection almost exclusively, circumventing the Hermeneutics of Suspicion or any
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postcritical (in the sense of retaining lessons from suspicious critique even after qualifying it)
attitudes or readings. As these scholars show, these recollective interpretations are justified and
are certainly in keeping with what Berry seems to desire for a reader of his text. Indeed, these
scholars illuminate Berry’s work with great insight. Yet, as I hope to demonstrate in the course
of this thesis, Berry’s insights on culture, agriculture, and place can also offer important
contributions to critical theory and literary criticism, and his inclusion in these conversations
most helpfully comes through the developing the emerging postcritical field. Berry’s thought and
fiction primes scholars for a postcritical hermeneutics, for ways of reading that move forward
from (and with) suspicion into new ways of reading for new political, cultural, and literary
challenges. Without reading Berry postcritically and incorporating Berry’s own thought into
postcritique, we are left with a truncated list of options for reading his work in response to the
political and environmental crises that he (and critical theorists) hope to address and change.

How One Might Read Now: Postcritique and the Challenges for Suspicion
I return to Felski’s question “how else might we read?” This postcritical provocation is a
more generative way to respond to Berry’s notice for readers of Jayber Crow. The recognition of
the three different critical schools reminds literary critics that we have choice not just between
critical theories (feminism, postcolonialism, queer theory, etc.) but between different ways of
relating to a text, different affects that we can embody when we read, research, and write, that do
not take away from rigorous, careful, intellectually valuable work. There is still much to make us
suspicious (and, therefore, still a use for suspicious hermeneutics). However, as I will explain
below, many of the once assumed advantages of the Hermeneutics of Suspicion and the assumed
natural connection between suspicion and progressive critique and activism have been
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undermined in the twenty-first century, particularly the past decade or so. Here I will address
three developments which have undermined suspicious hermeneutics: the post-normative status
of neoliberalism that calcifies the ideology into an ontology, evading epistemology-centered
ideology critiques of knowledge production and normativity, the co-opting of suspicion by the
far Right, and the self-consciously visible performances of violence and oppression by those
whom ideology critique has identified as with power.
Berry’s novel, told by its narrator in 1986 and published in 2000, is placed squarely in the
age of neoliberalism, dated typically from the late 1970s through the current day. Wendy Brown,
in her 2003 article defining neoliberalism and its incompatibility with liberal democracy, notes
that in neoliberal ideology, human action is “cast in terms of a market rationality…as rational
entrepreneurial action.” It has become a “social analysis” for interpreting human action and
interaction, and all action in all spheres of life is analyzed according to “considerations of
profitability,” by criteria of “utility, benefit, or satisfaction against a…grid of scarcity, supply
and demand, and moral value-neutrality” (Brown). Since values are neutral, morality is reduced
to “self-care” or “the ability to provide for [one’s] own needs and service [one’s] own
ambitions,” making one “calculating rather than rule-abiding” (Brown). Instead of believing in a
“free” market (whose freedom has been largely debunked by critique), the government actively
preserves and promotes the market through policymaking and norming (Brown). Whereas liberal
democracy still idealized some form of public sphere for its community, the ideal neoliberal
social body “would be the opposite of public-minded, indeed it would barely exist as a public.
The body ceases to be a body but is, rather, a group of individual entrepreneurs and consumers”
(Brown). Even though democracy is still a popular buzzword for the neoliberals (hence the
“liberal” in neoliberal), Brown sees neoliberalism at odds with liberal democracy–not in the way
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that totalitarianism is but in a way that destroys many features of democracy, like efforts of
social justice and collective action, under the banner of entrepreneurial freedom (Brown).
Neoliberalism has, of course, drawn the attention of critical theory from its start.
However, theorists have begun to question the efficacy of the field’s standard critical theoretical
tools for undermining and dismantling neoliberalism. Neoliberalism, Mitchum Huehls argues,
has gone beyond a “normative formation” in a Foucauldian sense–an epistemological model,
prescribing norms and disciplining its citizens to adhere to them–to also include a “postnormative formation,” where its “power derive[s] from its hands-off, administrative shaping of a
lived environments,” outside of any active disciplining (3). In other words, it takes itself to create
a normless and telos-less playing field, where intervention comes only in the form of preventing
the inhibition of one’s pursuit of profit maximization. This administrative role in neoliberalism
has brought with it a neoliberal ontology: not only is neoliberalism a “social analysis,” per
Brown, but an assumed picture of what a person is. This ontological picture precedes critique’s
usual object of analysis: what we know and how we relate to one another in social formations.
This new ontology Huehls terms the “neoliberal circle”: neoliberalism “vacillate[s]” between
addressing one’s subjectivity, or “our unique individuality,” and our objectivity, “our status as
homogenized objects…part of a team, network, or community” (9-10). Importantly, these two
aspects are treated as pure and distinct from each other, keeping us, though we are both, from
recognizing ourselves as having “hybridity,” or a “subject-object simultaneity” that is both of
these concurrently and inseparably (8, 23). One is addressed as an individual, or one is addressed
as a number among the masses–sometimes one, sometimes the other, but never as both at the
same time in a complex, hybrid ontology. Because of this, neoliberalism can contain contentious,
debated positions–debates between the rights of the individual and the compulsion to accept
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one’s status as a homogenized object, “a cog in the machine”–within itself (11). Neoliberalism
can, in one instance, champion the individual subject, then, in the next, speak of groups as
resources and markets to be accessed and used in the quest for profit maximization (11). Because
it is able to do both, it is a tent wide enough to capture conflicting opinions. For instance, when it
comes to feminism and activism regarding gender, neoliberalism can contain expressive
individualism (having the right to perform gender as one senses to be most authentic, without
fear of recrimination) and objective homogenization (certain social conservative reassertions of
[traditionally defined] women’s role in reproduction and domesticity, or, alternatively, some
feminist arguments for increasing women’s access to higher paying, but still cog-in-the-machine
positions in corporations). While all contend with each other, all are also contained within
neoliberalism in its post-normative, ontological formation, for none of them contrast themselves
with the purification and vacillation between subjectivity and objectivity that neoliberalism has
established.
Ideology critique, then, similarly fails to oppose neoliberalism, since it also typically
maintains the same purifying, vacillating ontological picture. Critique alternates between
“objective facts” to expose the exploitation behind euphemistic deception and “subjective
values” to resist cold, dehumanizing forms of rationalism (14). One is objective now, and
subjective later, but never both at the same time. Critique does not offer a true alternative to
neoliberalism, as it rests on the same assumed ontology of purification and vacillation that
precedes epistemological norms (14). Neoliberalism is flexible enough, as a post-normative
ontology, to allow critics to critique its normative epistemology without really being threatened
with disruption or transformation in its ontological formation.
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In addition to this entanglement of critique with post-normative neoliberalism, critique’s
trademark affect of suspicion has become entangled with far-Right, regressive politics. Bruno
Latour asks, “What has happened to critique?” as he reflects on the ways that suspicion in
critique has become so popularized that it has become a tool for climate change deniers, 9/11
Truthers, and moon landing conspiracists (226-32). In the phenomena he names “instant
revisionism,” suspicion about the truth of events and the placement of them in a larger
conspiracy narrative obscure the ability to talk about facts and reality (228). Mark Dery, in a
close reading of the QAnon Shaman’s manifesto after the January 6 insurrection, uses Frank
Mintz’s term “conspiracism,” the “belief in the primacy of conspiracies in the unfolding of
history,” to understand the far Right (and increasingly mainstream Republican) suspicion
towards Democrats and towards American political institutions more broadly (qtd. in Dery).
Conspiracism, for Dery, “is what happens when the hermeneutics of suspicion escapes the page,
into the wild”: “anything can be a sign, a symbol, disinformation, propaganda, psy-ops, a
subliminal message, evidence of dark designs and covert ops” (Dery). While confidence in
political institutions has been eroded since the 1960s for much of the population, “it’s the Right’s
weaponization of that uncertainty that spread the virus of conspiracism” (Dery). Suspicion has
become so ubiquitous that both progressives and conservatives can denounce the same entity for
radically different reasons: Henry Giroux can critique Disney for a “politics of innocence” that
hides “the power of a multinational conglomerate that has little regard for free speech and public
criticism,” while Fox and Friends can critique Disney for “indoctrinat[ing]” children and
families with a “woke agenda,” for denouncing a homophobic and transphobic law (Giroux 32;
Hill). As Umberto Eco argues, a defining feature of fascism is “obsession with a plot” in order to
bring about identity and conformity (Eco). Fascism, the mortal enemy of ideology critique and
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progressive democratic politics, takes up the same suspicious affective position towards the
world as critique–a suspicion that is “asocial,” detrimental to communal life and well-being
(Felski, “Suspicious Minds” 221). In the widespread presence of suspicion, progressive social
justice aims have often been lost or abandoned, and, as Sedgwick argues, a person being
suspiciously critical “does not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin that person to any specific train
of epistemological or narrative consequences” (124). Suspicion, having come to dominate
progressivism, has now taken up a significant space in regressivism as well, undermining its
status as a revolutionary tool.
Critique’s need for suspicion has further been undermined by the growing vigor with
which violent, oppressive people and groups publicly and visibly perform their violence and
oppression. While there have always been examples of visible violence by oppressive power
structures (lynching in the American South, for instance), one of the key tenets of the
Hermeneutics of Suspicion is that social power structures and complicit literary texts most often
seek to hide or stay blissfully unaware of their racism, sexism, homophobia, or ableism. Yet this
assumption has been questioned and qualified by many postcritical scholars. Referencing the
scandal of Abu Ghraib and the lack of governmental response to post-Katrina New Orleans, Best
and Marcus note, “the assumption that domination can only do its work when veiled, which may
once have sounded almost paranoid, now has a nostalgic, even utopic ring to it” (2). Reflecting
upon published videos of beheadings by terrorist groups that “commit atrocities in order to
release their videos,” Toril Moi says, “we no longer believe that power always seeks to cover its
tracks” (“‘Nothing is Hidden’” 31). Indeed, while the Internet has made the unmasking of power
structures more possible (#MeToo, #Blacklivesmatter), it has emboldened those who have been
unmasked to seek maximum visibility. For instance, Payton Gendron, the White supremacist
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who perpetrated a racially motivated mass shooting in Buffalo, New York, livestreamed his
attack on Twitch (Browning). The visibility of every major and minor news network’s week-long
coverage was not enough; there was an embrace of visibility as a critical feature of the shooting.
And, as Malcolm Gladwell has noted, the manifesto and video publications of mass shooters,
getting the word out about their intentions and ideological motivations before, during, and after
the act itself, are the modus operandi of mass shooters post-Columbine (Gladwell). While
political institutions have traditionally at least attempted to cover their tracks, in the Trump era of
politics, “the cruelty is the point,” as public displays of ableism, sexism, racism, and homophobia
became part of the package for much of the Republican Party (Serwer). In the face of visible
oppression, Sedgwick asks, “what does a hermeneutics of suspicion and exposure have to say to
social formations in which visibility itself constitutes much of the violence” (140)? Indeed,
commitment to analyzing and exposing covert subjugation risks becoming tautological when the
oppressors not only do not fear but also actively embrace their exposure.
The assumptions linking critique to suspicion have been weakened and somewhat
undermined—high-visibility violence shields itself against the power of suspicion, while
simultaneously wielding suspicion against progressive activism and programs–and neoliberalism
stands over the battle, unable to be touched by either side. While postcritical theorists still
recognize the value of suspicion, they question the deployment of it at all times, in all
circumstances: reading suspiciously “unintentionally impoverish[es] the gene pool of literarycritical perspectives and skills. The trouble with a shallow gene pool, of course, is its diminished
ability to respond to environmental (e.g., political) change” (Sedgwick 144). A new era of
critique that diversifies the gene pool of affects, positions, and approaches, taking the lessons of
the Hermeneutics of Trust and Suspicion (and, indeed, still turning to these when necessary, as
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they still so often are) while responding to the unique challenges of this historical moment, will
allow literary theory, both as a university institution and as a transformative political force, to
adapt to the challenges of the twenty-first century.
In what follows, I will describe and implement one such way of reading: Toril Moi’s use
of Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) for doing the work of literary criticism. (I term this
“doing the work” because, as I will show in the following, her use of OLP resists the
conventional concept of “theory”). “Ordinary Language Philosophy” is a term that is used to
denote the school of thought in the philosophy of language that was inaugurated by Wittgenstein
and J.L. Austin, as interpreted and expanded by Stanley Cavell and Cora Diamond (Moi,
Revolution 1). Moi, a feminist theorist, in various articles but most comprehensively in her book
Revolution of the Ordinary, has been the primary driving force to bring the work of OLP into
literary criticism and, more specifically, postcritical literary criticism. Using her work on
ordinary language, with occasional recourse to Felski’s and Huehls’ use of Latourian ActorNetwork Theory and Sedgwick’s “reparative reading,” I will argue that reading Berry’s Jayber
Crow in this way will both satisfy the demands laid out by Berry, reading his novel in the most
symbiotic, reparative way, and generate new possibilities for reading and thinking in the twentyfirst century–two goals that I believe are intertwined.
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ORDINARY PLACED READING: LITERARY STUDIES AFTER ORDINARY
LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY AND WENDELL BERRY

Both the Hermeneutics of Trust and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion picture language
through the metaphor of surface/depth: the word at the surface, and the meaning in the depths.
Though, as we have seen, these two are very different from each other, both posit a gap between
word and meaning, a gap that deconstructionists have enjoyed exposing and freely playing
within, and that ideology critics and have exposed as the gap between innocuous formations and
hidden violence and oppression. Yet this near-hegemonic picture of language has its detractors:
Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin and Stanley Cavell have developed in their philosophies an
alternative picture of language, not to return our understanding of language to a naïve,
commonsensical picture but to acknowledge and give attention to the vast array of things that
people do with language and what language does in the world. Toril Moi uses this picture of
language from Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) to similarly acknowledge and attend to the
vast array of things that people do with literature and what literature does in the world. This
picture, linked with Wendell Berry’s thought and activism, offers revolutionarily ordinary
picture of language and literature to make meaning more effectively in literary and cultural
studies, offering generative responses to the cultural impasses that conventional suspicious
literary criticism has had difficulty overcoming.

Ordinary Language Philosophy: Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell on Language
Central to the picture of language that Ordinary Language Philosophy asserts is the
location of a word/utterance’s meaning in its everyday, ordinary uses. The commonly identified
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mantra for the Wittgensteinian philosophy of language is his statement that “the meaning of a
word is its use in the language” (qtd. in Moi, Revolution 29). However, as Moi notes, this
seemingly simple (or, as some have argued, simplistic) notion of meaning-as-use is hard to
grasp, especially for those beholden to what Moi calls an Augustinian conception of language as
primarily attaching names to entities–a conception, she argues, that includes structuralists and
poststructuralists who hold the same picture from a skeptical stance (Revolution 27). “Use,” she
says, “is not a ground. Use is a practice grounded on nothing. Use is simply what we do” (29).
Words are, in Austinian terms, always “performative” in that we, like with virtually any other
available tool, do things when we employ language (Austin 91). Words, then, “get their meaning
from the sentences they appear in,” from what use the speaker is putting them towards (Moi,
Revolution 34).
Language is used in what Wittgenstein calls “language-games.” The term “languagegame” is, as Moi notes, elusive of a clear definition, much like “game” more broadly:
characteristics like having a winner, having multiple players, or having an objective might
capture many games, but one could think of many examples of games that do not meet these
criteria (47). The only commonalities across games, at least all the games that I know, are (1)
that all players (even if one is playing alone) recognize that one is in a game, as opposed to
whatever one was doing before or after the game; and (2) that there are rules (of varying levels of
flexibility) governing the game that are distinct from what governs action before and after the
game. These rules signal to players and observers that a game (and, to those familiar with enough
games, which particular game) is or is not being played, such as when a soccer player refuses to
touch the ball with his hands during the game but feels at liberty to pick up the ball as soon as the
game is over. Beyond this, little unites the category of “game.” The same is true for
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Wittgenstein’s language-games: a language-game, according to Moi, “does something
reasonably specific. It is an action. It can be described by a verb” (Revolution 48). It is a variably
rule-bound action that is commonly recognized as doing a particular, specific thing. Examples
given by Wittgenstein include “giving orders, and acting on them…Reporting an
event…Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams…Making up a story; and
reading one…Cracking a joke” (qtd. in Moi, Revolution 46). As Moi notes, this list has few
commonalities, differing in how much language is involved in the game (as opposed to
“nonlinguistic action”), and how widespread the game is enacted in a social group (46). What
they share in common is using language and, if done in one’s first or well-learned language,
recognition of when the game is enacted in ordinary life and agreement on certain rules or
norms. There is not a fixed number of games that a language holds: as people wish to do new
things with words, they establish new games, and when a group no longer wishes to do
something (e.g., the language-game of negotiating a dowry in an arranged marriage), they simply
stop playing that language-game (46)–although, of course, one might enact the language-game of
dowry negotiation in the game of acting or telling a story. Just as children continually invent new
games and grow out of old ones, so social groups invent and abandon language-games (with their
own rules) as needed.
It is in language-games, these reasonably specific actions, that words get their meaning.
A word means something when it is used. Moi opposes this to a theory of language that either
posits a conceptual ground for the meaning of a word (in a thing, in a signified) or, believing that
this ground is unstable or nonexistent, replaces the concept of a ground with the concept of
groundlessness, or “iterability” (Revolution 71). These generalizable concepts, whether affirmed
or denied, are quite beside the point for Wittgenstein, because his conception of meaning is never
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generalized beyond how people are using words, meaning that there is no concept or ground to
be deconstructed in the first place–only words being used by people to do things. Any attempt to
set up words as having these sorts of generalizable meanings is, for Wittgenstein, to put language
“on holiday,” meaning that doing this is to stand in the way of words working in the world, thus
creating confusion (qtd. in Moi, Revolution 48). For instance, to ask with the ontologists “what
does it mean to be? What is being?” while interesting to consider, will not help much to
understand what a parent means by telling their child “Be good,” or what Hamlet means by “to
be or not to be?” or what Lil Wayne means by saying “we be steady mobbin.” The question, by
trying to make a concept out of the word “being,” prevents philosophers from attending to how
“being” and “be” are already meaning, right under their noses, out on the street and in homes
everywhere, being used to do a wide variety of things by ordinary people.
Language-games participate in what Wittgenstein calls “forms of life.” This term, Moi
notes, is often conflated with “social conventions,” or the recognition that human behavior and
practice is highly socially conditioned (Revolution 54). The “forms of life” of Wittgenstein does
not negate this social constructivism; however, the vast number of practices that Wittgenstein has
in mind includes the most ordinary, mundane practices that are not often marked as
epistemologically load-bearing practices and therefore are not often brought into question in
critique. Because of this, Moi argues, the practices are much more ingrained and difficult to
change than many theorists seem to imply (55). An example Wittgenstein gives is the practice
pointing at something: he asks readers to imagine that, in response to a person pointing, their
interlocutor looks from the pointed finger to the wrist, instead of from the finger to the intended
object (qtd. in Moi, Revolution 57). One could imagine such a case (therefore demonstrating the
contingency of the practice of pointing), but those raised with Wittgenstein’s (and America’s)
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notion of pointing will not easily imagine or practice it for themselves (57). The practice is
contingent in that it could be different, but it is ingrained in such a way that it becomes, in a
sense, naturalized to members of the social group (56).
Furthermore, a “form of life” consists of both this social conditioning and a person’s
natural and biological conditions and limitations (Revolution 56). While a person is obviously
profoundly cultural, that same person also has a body and an ecology that exists and makes
possible any form of life at all. For example, pointing, as we have seen, is socially conditioned;
however, it is based to an extent on the natural condition of the arm, hand, and finger. Our social
practice of pointing necessitates the anatomical body as a condition for the existence of the
practice.1 These forms of life, Moi says, “range from the purely biological to the completely
cultural,” varying in how natural and cultural they are, but containing both in an inextricable
combination (56). The mutability of changing the form of life also ranges; natural conditions
(such as climate changes or agricultural developments) and cultural conditions (colonization,
Internet expansion) can change, reshaping the natural and cultural conditions of the forms of life,
thereby changing the practices of the social group.
Wittgenstein and Cavell speak of a group’s “agreement” on forms of life. Wittgenstein
says, “it is in their language that human beings agree” (qtd. in Moi, Revolution 60). This has
drawn the ire of many theorists who hear a return to normativity and prescriptivism. However,
the emphasis here is on what a person is doing before any sort of judgment or valuation can
happen: interlocutors must agree on what a speaker is doing before judgments about the
statement can be made. If two people do not share an agreement on what is being done, there can
be no possibility for interpretability, in Smith and Nelson’s sense of the “meaning behind
word/utterance,” or the way one is using the word (334). For example, if someone were to make
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a racist joke, I might respond with “I don’t find that funny.” However, in so saying, I agree that
they are enacting the practice of telling a joke. If I grew up with no form of life of telling jokes,
their statement would be uninterpretable to me, and I would struggle to make a proper judgment
and response. Before evaluations can be made, there must be agreement on what is being done,
thus OLP’s insistence on agreement on shared language-games and forms of life.
Language-games play a significant role in the forms of life of a particular group.
Language-games, of course, are cultural, but depend on the natural conditions of voice (or hands,
for speakers of sign languages). Language also takes part with other practices in a group’s forms
of life. For example, if in the language-game of giving orders I were to say, “Go there!” and
point, the form of life of pointing becomes part of the form of life of giving orders. Languagegames, then, participate in forms of life–some are almost exclusively language-games, while
some contain only non-linguistic forms. Language, like all other practices, combine natural and
cultural factors into shared, agreed-upon forms that give clarity to a group’s communal life.
To learn what a word means, then, is not primarily to know a definition but to learn what
someone is doing whenever they employ the word. Moi argues that “to learn a language is not to
learn a set of names, but to be trained in–to learn to recognize and participate in–a vast number
of human practices” (Revolution 44). While a child will learn to attach the signifier “mama” to
their mother and “ball” to a bouncy rubber sphere, they will much more pointedly learn “mama!”
as a call for help and “ball!” as a request (or a demand). The child is invited into human activity,
doing actions required for survival and participation in social life that they will continue to use to
survive and participate into adulthood. This goes even for so-called extraordinary language, that
language that is reserved for the usually highly educated elite–medical jargon, philosophical
jargon, poetry. These are not outside of ordinary language-games but are themselves specific
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language-games. Avid poetry readers, including poetry scholars, have been initiated into the
game and have picked up on the rules. Much like the child being initiated into the practices that
use “mama!” and “ball!” new readers can always be initiated, picking up the practices and
“learning to see” as those who have seen for a long time (Moi, Revolution 33).
In order to get a grip on the meaning of a word, either when learning a language or when
encountering misunderstanding or confusion, one looks closely at the way the word is used in its
ordinary use. This close look is what Wittgenstein calls a “grammatical investigation.”
“Grammar” is the term for the rules of a language-game. When one does, in the course of
playing their various language-games in their life, run into confusion, one undertakes a
grammatical investigation to analyze the source of that confusion, the “criteria for using the
word,” in order to come to clarity (Moi, Revolution 53). This is what World Englishes scholars
Smith and Nelson term “interpretability,” the third level of “knowing” a word: beyond
“intelligibility,” which is “word/utterance recognition,” and “comprehensibility,” or
“word/utterance meaning,” interpretability is the “meaning behind word/utterance,” or the way
one is using the word (334). A word might be recognized and known, but until one knows what a
speaker is doing with the word, what criteria they are using, the meaning of an utterance will be
lost, as in Moi’s move from “feed the cat,” to “feed the meter,” to the uninterpretable “feed the
table”—which, she supposes, might be interpretable to a community where such an idiom
transacts (Revolution 52). There is no single method for any and all grammatical investigations;
the only direction Moi gives is to give “attentive investigation [to] the ordinary and the
everyday…giv[ing] up the quest for ultimate explanations and grand theories” (Moi, Revolution
63). Or, as Felski implores in her use of Neophenomenology, we are to go “back to the things
themselves” (Uses 17). The way that one comes to know what a word means is to give careful
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account of examples of the word used in everyday language, of who says the word to whom, and
“what work a word does in a sentence [and] the work the sentence does in the specific
circumstances in which it is uttered” (Moi, Revolution 34). In this investigation, one “looks at
what we should say when,” getting a clear idea on “our criteria for using words in particular
ways” (51-52).
This cuts against the standard theoretical strategy of coming to know the meaning of a
word or utterance, which isolates the word/concept and generalizes it, seeking to apprehend a
once-and-for-all meaning or, demonstrating its once-and-for-all undecidability. This way of
thinking of language is what Wittgenstein calls the “craving for generality,” or “the
contemptuous attitude towards the particular case,” which seeks to put knowledge into clearly
defined conceptual categories (qtd. in Moi, Revolution 95). For example, as I have demonstrated
above, the Hermeneutics of Suspicion has generally theorized language to have a surface and a
depth and, because of this, an impetus to deceive. However, for Ordinary Language
Philosophers, language is “infinite, open-ended, and fundamentally untheorizable,” meaning that
its uses are always too much in flux and too flexible to be put under any sort of theory; therefore,
no one can put a word or an utterance (or language as such) into a generalizable, conceptual
“meaning” (Moi, Revolution 95). This generality can, at best, make a word comprehensible (if it
does not make it entirely incomprehensible, which sometimes happens), but gives no help to
interpretability in specific circumstances. Instead, theorists look at examples of a word’s use to
get an idea of its meaning(s). Moi pushes against the theory of language’s inherent
deceptiveness, not to say that meaning is always self-evident or commonsensical but to pull
away from the generalization and push towards concrete examples: language is not deceitful per
se, but speakers can be deceitful (“‘Nothing is Hidden’” 36). One might lie, or one might just as

26

well tell the truth. Sometimes deception is not even a useful concept to consider, like in the
language-game of ordering food off of a restaurant menu. The work of an Ordinary Language
Philosopher or an OLP-influenced literary critic, then, is not to create a theory of language, or
oppressive language, or epistemology, but to examine examples of word-use, or examples of
language used to oppress women or People of Color or disabled people, or under what
circumstances a person might use the word “know” or express a certain type of knowledge. One
learns by close attention to ordinary language, picking up on what the person is doing and what
grammar guides the action done.

OLP and Literary Criticism
This picture of language, rejecting old pictures that emphasize concepts, representation,
and naming, translates into an equally differing picture of reading and literary criticism. It
unwrites several assumptions about language that undergird suspicious hermeneutics and much
literary criticism, namely, the “literariness” of literary language (as opposed to ordinary
language), the status of a text as an object, the picture of the reader as a knowing applier of a
method to the text, and the picture of politics primarily centered on theories and concepts.
For Ordinary Language Philosophers, literature, in all its various genres, is a selection of
several language-games among many. Often, texts are treated as something other than everyday
language, and much time and effort has been spent on defining “literature,” naming and
describing what that special category consists of–an endeavor that, like other cravings for
generality, is never quite settled. This Felski calls “theological” reading, which treats literature as
set apart from and unconcerned with the everyday lives of readers, having value wholly outside
of real-world use or consequence (Uses 4-5). Theological readings “are propelled by a deep-
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seated discomfort with everyday language and thought,” believing that literature is a special
category of language outside of the ordinary (Uses 13). In contrast to this, instead of othering
literature, OLP pictures literature as specific language-games among other language-games. The
writing and reading of poetry, for example, is figured as a game, where writer and reader
recognize themselves to be playing the game of poetry, with its own rules (which vary in degree
of flexibility). Therefore, a reader will not be perplexed when they get fragmentary descriptions
or clever double entendres at a poetry reading, because they know these are allowed in the game.
If they got these fragmentary descriptions or double entendres from the mechanic working on
their car, they might become suspicious that they are being scammed, because the rules for
negotiating labor and economic exchanges value clarity more than the rules for poetry. Further,
as Bakhtin has noted, novelistic discourse, while its own specific discourse, is primarily
noteworthy as a genre in its creative arrangement of other discourses, of which he names letterwriting, diary-writing, speeches, and individual characters’ speech and interaction (262). These
discourses are ordinary, everyday language-games, which the author puts to use in the game of
writing and reading novels, where readers come expecting to play the game and receive many
different language-games within the story.
While other language-games, such as those in the marketplace or a social group, might
happen more often than poetry or novel reading, all are examples of language-games, precluding
the general distinction between literary and ordinary language. And, as Felski notes, reflective
reading “is powered by, and indebted to, many of the same motives and structures that shape
everyday thinking,” and pretending otherwise, as many who read literature critically are inclined
to do, misses the variety of ways literature does things in the ordinary, everyday world (Uses 13).
In the same way that even literary language is a type of ordinary language, readers have
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“ordinary motives for reading” (14). Writers and readers of whatever level of sophistication enter
the language-games of literature as ordinary, everyday language users.
Second, OLP pictures literary texts primarily as actions or expressions, not as objects.
Words and sentences, in Wittgenstein's view, are actions, and, as Moi notes, a literary text is a
“particularly complex action or intervention,” i.e., an action that enters into a network of alreadyhappening action (Moi, “‘Nothing is Hidden’” 36). Picturing the literary work as an action
connects it to its actor: texts “reveal the speaker…[and] have consequences…spreading far
beyond the original moment of utterance (Moi, Revolution 196). This somewhat lifts the ban on
investigating intention: as Moi notes, “the ‘death of the author’ doesn’t apply to actions, for
actions aren’t divorced from their doers in the same way as objects from their makers”
(“‘Nothing is Hidden’” 36). The author’s action of creating their work can be examined and
questioned as a complex process of decisions, strategies, inclusions, and commissions that have
consequences (intended and unintended by the author) upon the communicative act to readers. I
will elaborate on a different way of considering intention below, in my discussion of reading as
acknowledgement.
As Moi notes, texts are both object and action (Revolution 196). This connects with
Huehls’ and Felski’s use of Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory in literary criticism. Latour’s
“networks” are made up of subject-object hybrid “actants”—“anything human or nonhuman that
has an effect on anything else” that “forge[s] networks and alliances that produce significance
and value” (Huehls 20). These networks are always in flux, connecting and disconnecting from
each other for new significance (21). Texts are actants, having effects on others in the world
when people buy and read them. Meaning, then, comes from acts of “coproduction between
actors that [bring] new things to light rather than an endless rumination on a text’s hidden
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meanings or representational failures” (Felski, Limits 174). Ricœur helps explain how the two
aspects of the text, object and action, work together. Even though much of his work is beholden
to a gratuitous surface/depth picture of language and a “death of the author” picture of literature,
he is right to recognize that “the sense of the text is the direction which it opens up for thought,”
which makes interpretation “an act of the text” (“What is a Text?” 150). The act of reading
enacts the text, making it mean as it “finds at last an environment and an audience, a world and
an intersubjective dimension” (146). In other words, a text sits as an inert object until the act of
reading gives the text someone to act upon. As Felski notes, “history is not a box,” and texts can
move beyond periods and become attached to new eras, “mak[ing] a difference on those people
they are attached to (Limits 154). In reading, “we encounter fresh ways of organizing perception”
as we read texts that we become attached to (Limits 174). Literature, for OLP, primarily acts,
expresses, and intervenes, rather than represents.
The third aspect of literary criticism that OLP undermines has more to do with
specifically critical reading that usually happens in theoretical, professional spaces: that literary
critics do not primarily approach the text with a method, but with a “spirit” of reading. Moi
questions the reality of the reading method, questioning if what we usually term “method”—
Marxist, feminist, disability, historicist readings employed in criticism–are actually methods at
all. She notes the difficulty in explaining exactly what our methods are to other disciplines such
as the sciences, beyond simply the method of close reading. Close reading, by her account, is the
method, whether one is a rigidly traditional formalist or a determined deconstructionist
(“‘Nothing is Hidden’” 34). Instead, what are termed methods usually are our political
investments, guiding our attention and spirits of reading. Referencing Cora Diamond’s work,
Moi defines “spirit,” as an “attitude” towards the text, similar to Felski's “affect” and Sedgwick’s
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“position” (Revolution 63). This, and not a “method,” is the primary driver of literary criticism:
the spirit that one embodies when reading, leading to asking certain questions, whether those are
questions about women, race, or class conflict, and accepting certain evidence and answers, such
as historical conditions or other extratextual sources.
The spirit that OLP embodies is a “realistic” spirit that emphasizes attention to and
acknowledgement of the action of the text, picturing reading as an adventure. Moi describes the
realistic spirit as “ordinary…[where] attention–the willingness to look and see–is the very
hallmark…encourag[ing] us to root around in the dusty rags of our lives [and] pay attention to
particulars” (Revolution 63). The realistic reader gives attention to ordinary language and action,
not overlooking it for the generalizable theories. Attention, the hallmark of the realistic spirit, is
defined as a “just and loving gaze,” that is “open and waiting in relation to reality” (Moi,
Revolution 228). This echoes Felski’s use of neophenomenology, which takes up “an undogmatic
openness to a spectrum of literary responses” (Uses 18). This kind of attentive openness,
Sedgwick notes in her promotion of the reparative position of reading, opens readers up to
surprise, which paranoid reading usually tries to preclude; yet this surprise is not always a
negative, oppressing power–it can be “additive and accretive” (149). In Best and Marcus’
estimation, this attentiveness to the text–not to find some hidden depth, but to the text itself–is
“itself a kind of freedom” (16). In attention to particulars, readers can encounter new problems
and questions and generate profound readings of texts outside of the purview of dominant
literary theories.
Suspicious readers, of course, give close attention to the texts they read, poring over the
details of the texts and ruminating, even obsessing over their hidden meanings and their
representations of particular social formations and identities. They give such close attention that
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Sedgwick sees in paranoid reading a certain form of love (131). Yet critical theory, especially
suspicious hermeneutics, typically attend to the text with what Sedgwick calls an “anticipatory”
affect: beginning and ending with the expectation of finding oppression and deception in the text,
and then attending to the text with “future oriented vigilance” to find these and avoid “bad
surprises” (130). This future-oriented vigilance is done, somewhat paradoxically, by what
Abraham Heschel terms “explaining” the text, which he defines as “seeing the present in the past
tense,” or “see[ing] what we already know” in the text (xii). This way of reading begins with past
intellectual breakthroughs (be it a theory of oppression or deconstruction of a troublesome
concept) and makes the past insight that which is seen in the present act of reading or makes the
act of reading an exercise in seeing these past insights (xii). Sedgwick seems to suggest that
paranoid readers mitigate the risk of present and future ideological interpellation or violence by
resting on and returning to the trusty theories that delivered critics from past forms of delusion
and oppression–breakthroughs by Marx, Foucault, Crenshaw, et al. The theories one employs
help one avoid the “bad surprises” of deception or violence in the text, so attentive readings are
often done on behalf of a generalized theory–either validating, correcting, or formulating a
theory, whether it is about literature or about political concerns. Yet Heschel (and, I think,
Sedgwick) note that this “repetitiveness” of the past blocks what he terms “insight,” or
“think[ing] in the present” (xii). This insight begins in “feeling painfully the lack of knowing”
that about which readers concern themselves as they read and achieving the “breakthrough” of
“seeing the phenomenon [i.e., the act of the text] from within” the text (xi-xii). For postcritical
theorists, and OLP readers particularly, the attention is to the text and through the text. Broader
theories and historical studies help aid in gaining insight from the text rather than explaining the
text. Readers in the realistic spirit of OLP, setting aside generalized theories as the starting point
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and the goal, attend to the text’s own action and consequences–a practice in OLP called
“acknowledgement.”
Central to attentive reading is the practice of acknowledgement. Acknowledgement is “a
response to the expressions of another…an effort to understand these expressions” (Moi,
Revolution 216). Many theorists, captive to a picture of knowledge that operates on a
certainty/skepticism binary, dismiss acknowledgment as impossible, given the uncertainty or
deceptiveness of authorial intention. However, for Ordinary Language Philosophers,
acknowledgement is a different picture of knowledge: it is a matter of responding to what we do
know from our perceptions of another’s actions, including their utterances–for instance, if we see
someone choking, we respond with help, not critical doubt over if they are actually in danger or
merely acting (206-07). The opposite of acknowledgement is not certainty or ignorance but “the
absence of action, the absence of response, or a noncomprehending, inept, callous response”
(208). Acknowledging a text moves critics from reading a text according to their own theoretical
preoccupations to “try[ing] to discover the work’s own concepts…understand[ing] our own
position in relation to the work’s concerns” (216-17). Readers acknowledge the claim that
another’s expression, even literary expression, has upon them, while also responding in an
individual, personal manner, according to the reader’s own spatial and temporal specifics and
their own sociopolitical interests (208-09). A reader brings their own feelings and concerns to a
text but also can be impacted by what the text itself does to them (Felski, Limits 178).
Acknowledgement, then, is to engage in a dynamic relationship with a text, with each acting
upon and responding to the other in a complex dance, instead of an active critic acting upon an
inert object of a text.
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In addition to the practice of acknowledgement, the realistic spirit cultivated by OLP
pictures reading as an adventure led by the author and undertaken collaboratively with the
reader. Reading in the spirit of adventure is to acknowledge the concerns of the author, going
with them and letting them unfold their concerns, moving in the text from confusion to
illumination (Moi, “Adventure of Reading” 131-32). Moi cites Beauvoir’s understanding of
reading from “Literature and Metaphysics” as a paradigmatic case of such a spirit: “A good
novel…is an invitation to the reader to share the author’s sense of exploration and discovery, to
join her on an ‘authentic adventure of the mind’” (qtd. in Moi, “Adventure of Reading” 133).
This happens only when readers “let [a work] teach us how to read it” (132). This differs from
the standard theoretical reading of texts, that starts with knowingness and goes to the text to
demonstrate, refute, or formulate the theory; instead, reading in the spirit of OLP is best
considered theoryless reading: “we begin…not with a method, but with our own sense of
confusion…a reading is an attempt to get clear on something” (Moi, “‘Nothing is Hidden’” 38).
We begin lost, not sure what a text is trying to do or why it unfolds as it does, patiently attending
to the details to achieve some sense of clarity as to what the text does.
For Moi, literary criticism’s driving question ought to be “Why this?”: a reader
encounters a detail or a narrative that confuses or bewilders them, leading to questions about
“motivations, reasons, intentions…repercussions, ramifications, consequences…issues of
responsibility, ethics, and politics arising in and through the action” (“‘Nothing is Hidden’” 3637). Asking “why this?” is “to ask what work this feature does in the text” (Revolution 203). This
question can be about any of the vast number of aspects in a text, depending on what captivates
the readers or what the text leads them towards (Moi, “‘Nothing is Hidden’” 46). As the reader
gains clarity on the text, they also gain clarity on their own self: as Ricœur notes, “the
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interpretation of a text ends up in the self-interpretation of a subject who henceforth understands
himself better” (“What is a Text?” 145). A reader can ask, “why this?” in many different spirits,
including suspiciously–if the situation warrants it, as it often does (Moi, “‘Nothing is Hidden’”
37). Additionally, readers might read adventurously and still be duped or deluded, but this is not
always the case (Felski, “Postcritical Reading” 5). As Best and Marcus note, “sometimes our
subjectivity will help us see a text more clearly, and sometimes it will not” (18). The question
may lead to different conclusions for different readers in different places and eras, but the central
movement from confusion to clarity marks the act of reading for OLP.
In the same way that reading is pictured as the attention to and acknowledgment of
examples rather than conceptualizing general theories, cultural critique and activism becomes
marked by the analysis of examples of action, including language use. Critical theory, Moi notes,
is susceptible to the craving for generality in the analysis of oppression. She looks at feminism
specifically, noting the ways that, for instance, the contention over the definition of the word
“woman,” either trying to determine a once-and-for-all inclusive definition or dismissing the
term as inherently exclusive, pulls activists away from the world where the word is used for
identification and oppression (Revolution 90). Instead, she bids theorists to invest in the “power
of the particular case,” starting from ordinary, everyday experiences of language-use and
oppression (90-92). In a way similar to literary criticism, a cultural theorist can begin with an
experience that perplexes them–maybe because they are excluded from a place, or are attacked,
physically or rhetorically, or have a felt sense of confinement, boredom, or dread–and analyze
the details of the case to come to a clear view of the causes and effects of the experience (110).
This is not to say that this analysis is infallible: one might overlook important details while trying
to clarify and describe their experience. This is where turning to larger, harder-to-see forces (like
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economic modes of production, or cultural hegemonies, or institutional pedagogy) for help in
explaining becomes helpful (91). Further, one’s conclusions about their experience might not
quite capture what happens in another’s case. When this happens, these two thinkers can
compare and contrast their cases, looking for similarities and differences without the pressure to
subsume both to one theory (97).
Moi recognizes that this perplexity with experience already drives many of the
foundational texts of feminism. In her analysis of intersectionality, she shows that Kimberlé
Crenshaw begins with the troubling experiences of particular legal cases where Black women
received rulings that denied them redress for either racism or sexism. Crenshaw notes that Black
women often suffer from two discriminations simultaneously in a way that might be compared to
standing in the middle of a street intersection (Revolution 103). This, for Moi, is good work in
attending to examples. The craving for generality happens when “intersectionality” is set up as a
concept, abstracting it from concrete experiences and using it to subsume all examples under one
theory (103). Instead, Crenshaw’s work is best understood as the beginning of a clear view on
the experiences of Black women in the legal field. This description shares some (but likely not
all) features with, say, Black women’s experiences when receiving healthcare or playing sports,
which can help someone giving attention to these reach a clearer picture of the oppression
happening there. Activists must begin with concrete examples, recourse to other examples and
larger forces when needed, and then end with a description of the concrete case, which in turn
can aid others’ analyses and join the chorus of voices calling for systemic change.
Moi’s use of OLP in literary studies and critical theory offers a new picture of language,
reading, and political critique. Wendell Berry, in his preface to Jayber Crow, bid readers to
generate new pictures and practices of reading beyond suspicion. Berry’s thought, expressed in
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six decades of wide-ranging essays, resonates greatly with Wittgenstein’s, Cavell’s, and Moi’s
attention to particular, ordinary language use and attentive acknowledgement of the adventure of
reading. Additionally, Berry contributes to this tradition by concretizing language use and
reading to particular, natural-social-agricultural2 places, giving attention to where language is
used to further understand how language is used. In the following section, I will describe Berry’s
emphasis on particular cases and particular places (as opposed to generalities and abstractions),
before synthesizing his thought with OLP into a coherent picture of ordinary, placed, attentive
reading that, I argue, is a generative, productive practice of critical and political reading that
responds to the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Wendell Berry: Advocate for the Ordinary
In an interview with Time, Wendell Berry cites his wife Tanya’s claim that his “knack for
repeating [him]self” is his “principal asset” (Begley). While, as Berry scholars have
demonstrated, these concerns are primarily ecological, agrarian, and religious in nature, Berry’s
nearly sixty years of nonfiction writing has covered a vast array of topics, from racism and the
legacy of slavery (The Hidden Wound), to the wars in Vietnam, Kuwait, and Afghanistan (“A
Statement Against the War in Vietnam,” “Peaceableness Towards Enemies,” and “A Citizen’s
Response,” respectively), to feminism (“Feminism, the Body, and the Machine”), among other
occasional topics. The unifying self-repetition across all these topics and interests is Berry’s
relentless prioritization of the ordinary, the everyday, and the concrete and his polemicization
against generalization and abstraction, the “craving for generality” that Moi resists in critical
theory.
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Berry devotes much of his analysis of environmental degradation to the ways that
powerful forces and those that oppose them use language. He particularly takes issue with the
way that modern institutions and movements, on both political sides, rely on both generalized
and specialized language in their work, doing, in Berry’s estimation, more harm than good. For
Berry, these abuses of language are intertwined with the displacement of people from
agricultural and rural communities lived in by families from one generation to the next.
Americans have become “nomadic,” in the sense that they forsake “complex knowledge of one’s
place” to join the mobile workforce of the industrial economy (“Regional Motive” 68). While he
recognizes the value of nomadism in climates with little soil fertility, much of the United States
has or had enough fertile land to settle in place and remain as farmers, making this trend
unnecessary in the US (“Regional Motive” 68-69). He does not advocate that everyone become
farmers–as we will see, his fiction narrates the lives of rural folks from a variety of professions–
or that everyone necessarily leaves cities for rural communities. Instead, he argues for mode of
life responsible to and attentive to the natural-social-agricultural community in which one lives, a
mode of life of which small-scale farmers practicing regenerative agriculture form a paradigm
(68-69). This mode of life, however, has been displaced by what he specifies elsewhere as the
“industrial economy” which homogenizes particular places: “The evil of the industrial economy
(capitalist or communist) is the abstractness inherent in its procedures–its inability to distinguish
one place or person or creature from another” (“Out of Your Car” 23). This abstraction, which
decenters an economy and mode of life of responsible agriculture, enables the “urban nomadism”
that in turn further abstracts and homogenizes particular places (“Regional Motive” 69).
This abstracting nomadism, while leading to the abuse of land, also (or first) leads to the
abuse of language and, therefore, thought and culture. This abstracted way of picturing and
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talking about the world Berry calls “global thinking” and “national thinking,” which he argues is
an unrealistic and irresponsible way to think about the world: “those who have ‘thought
globally’...have done so by means of simplifications too extreme and oppressive to merit the
name of thought.…Global thinking can only be statistical” (“Out of Your Car” 19-20). He calls
such global thinkers “dangerous,” identifying this mode of thinking with imperialists and
corporationists, where the only thing one can do with this thinking is “be destructive on a very
large scale” (19). He compares this abstract thinking to space satellite photographs of the earth,
arguing that, like looking for one’s neighborhood in one of these pictures, it is impossible for
someone to recognize their neighborhood or township from such a distant point of view (20). As
ecocritical scholar Lenka Filipova notes, when this abstraction from place becomes the standard,
“individual places are stripped of their particularity other than their location on a map (51). This
facilitates the industrialism-enabled nomadism that, with no long-term relationship to the land,
facilitates land abuse and devaluation of placed communities (Berry, “Regional Motive” 68-69).
While the language of abstraction is used by destructive economists and politicians,
Berry recognizes the danger of progressive justice movements fighting this abstraction with their
own abstractions. These movements, when they fight in the arena of abstractions, cut themselves
off from the real-world, ordinary practices that are necessary for progress. Referencing the Civil
Rights movement and the environmentalist movement, Berry warns against movements
abstracting their language until it “mean[s] anything that anybody wants it to mean,” until the
movement “lose[s] its language either to its own confusion about meaning and practice or to
preemption by its enemies (“In Distrust of Movements” 284). Similarly, Berry argues that the
discourse around sex that has been abstracted from local community to a “public language of
sexuality” has become “inadequate to deal with the real issues and problems of
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sexuality…degenerat[ing] into a stupefying and useless contest between so-called liberation and
so-called morality” (“Sex, Economy, Freedom, and Community” 122). In the same essay, he
indicts education in this useless abstraction, noting that it “has become increasingly useless as it
has become increasingly public,” failing to recognize that “real education is determined by
community needs, not by public [i.e., generalized] tests” (123).
He attributes this uselessness in part to the “specialized” language of the university that
transacts in abstract concepts and disciplinary divisions: this language, far from shaping the
world or changing it, is a “cheat…hiding place…[and] an ambush” by failing to provide concrete
language for community needs (“Loss of the University” 79). Even the Southern Agrarians, with
whose resistance to industrialism Berry is often identified, practiced a regionalism while living
far from their own region, practicing an “agrarianism without agriculture” that “reduced their
effort to the level of an academic exercise” that was “doomed to remain theoretical” (“Regional
Motive” 66-67). With such generalized, abstract discourse, any hope at democracy is in danger,
as democratic pluralism becomes little more than an amalgamation of people displaced from
local communities and cultures (“Sex, Economy, Freedom, and Community” 169). And, with
this displacement, the destructive, imperialist, corporationist global thinkers can continue
displacing and degrading local communities and ecologies through the tool of abstract language.
Berry’s answer to the destructive tendencies of abstraction, similar to Moi’s and Felski’s,
is to give full attention to ordinary, everyday lives and concrete language use. Berry advocates
for what Filipova calls an “ethic of proximity” or, in his own words, the practice of “think[ing]
little” (Filipova 39; Berry, “Think Little” 80). Instead of abstract, large-scale, generalizing
movements, identities and political solutions are produced locally, “play[ing] out ‘on the
ground’” (Major 125). While he recognizes that human thought necessarily exists between the
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abstract and the concrete, he cautions against abstraction and equates usefulness and efficacy
with the movement away from the general towards the particular (Berry, “Word and Flesh” 197).
This turn towards the concrete requires “fidelity,” defined by Filipova as a “commitment
to a small local region” (38). To demonstrate the practice of fidelity, Berry turns to agriculture
researcher and activist Wes Jackson’s concept of the “eyes-to-acres ratio,” which gauges the
“competent watchfulness, aware of the nature and the history of the place, constantly present,
always alert for signs of harm and signs of health” that a place has and needs (Berry, “Farming
Without Farmers”). While each place varies in this ratio, Berry makes clear that in “global” or
“national” thinking, there are not enough eyes per acre to understand what is really happening or
to do anything about it. “The problems,” for Berry, “if we describe them accurately, are all
private and small. Or they are so initially,” becoming global or national problems only as enough
people give up close attention to the health of their place, becoming complicit in the problems
(“Word and Flesh” 198). Therefore, the task to undo these problems is to undo them locally, as
one assumes responsibility for and cares for the part of the world for which they can care for in a
direct, connected relationship with few enough acres for their eyes to attend to. Berry focuses his
reform efforts on “the responsible individual,” “suggest[ing] that social progress will come, if at
all, when people become more aware of their relationships and then labor to improve them”
(Freyfogle 182). Indeed, instead of beginning with abstract global solutions, Berry argues that
“the right local questions and answers will be the right global ones,” and that, in considering
involvement with institutions, goods, or movements, one should ask, “what will this do to our
community? (“Out of Your Car” 20).
This line of thinking has led to two main lines of criticism: first, Freyfogle argues that the
focus on “the responsible individual” in solving social and ecological crises risks missing the
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workings of larger forces, institutions, and ideologies (184). This picture of the entrepreneurial
individual, wedded to Jacksonian democratic ideals, is too dated to confront the workings of
global capitalism (190). Berry, however, hardly posits the solipsistic picture of the individual that
Freyfogle suggests. Berry prioritizes the role of community in mediating the relationship
between the public and the private spheres. Community, for Berry, is “the commonwealth of
common interests, commonly understood, of people living together in a place and wishing to
continue to do so” and “a locally understood interdependence of local people, local culture, local
economy, and local nature” (“Sex, Economy, Freedom, and Community” 120). Berry argues that
the local community “has to intervene between public and private” before either sphere
disintegrates sexuality into abstract public discourse or anti-community solipsism (118-19). The
public and the private spheres destroy each other without communal mediation and intervention
(119). Therefore, any understanding of a person cannot be abstracted to a public generality (like,
say, in Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities”) or reduced to the hyper-individualized
Cartesian subject; the person is always a community-bound individual, shaping and shaped by
their local community of nature, culture, and agriculture.
Along these lines, Filipova argues that Berry’s agrarian ethic, which focuses on the local,
becomes provincial and even tribalistic: his promotion of the local over the global “limit[s] the
ecocritical discourse and environmental awareness to that of the domesticated,” overlooking
interlocal activism and large-scale ecological degradation (56). Although Berry might not be
strictly individualistic, the refusal of global or national thinking is an apparent isolationism that
allows injustice to exist over there as long as it does not exist here. However, Berry’s work
shows both an awareness of the larger network of humanity and the translocal efforts to
understand and repair the world. While Berry emphasizes the priority of solving problems
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locally, he also argues that solving problems locally in every locale is the path to adequately
solving global and national problems (“Word and Flesh” 200). For instance, when arguing for
such domestic-level change, he argues that it is not merely oil and coal producers but consumers
and their “demand that energy be cheap and plentiful” that is driving environmental destruction
(198). Here he does not hold particular consumers or communities at fault but nearly all
communities in “‘developed’ countries”—consumers here becomes a large-scale demographic
rather than discrete individuals (198). Therefore, for him, it is not one community’s job to fix
these issues; instead, he advocates for a widespread ideological turn towards communal and
domestic health. This is underscored by the way he employs both micro- and macroscopic
language in describing solutions for environmental revitalization: “The question here [is]…how
to care for each of the planet’s millions of human and natural neighborhoods, each of its millions
of small pieces and parcels of land (200, emphasis added). In his argument as in his syntax, big
and small changes are inseparable. He recognizes that our environmental crisis is a massive
problem that will, in the end, require massive efforts to fix. However, he attempts to put largescale solutions and small-scale work back in their proper relation. Each community does its own
modest work in its own place, and as more places do this the large-scale problems are more and
more solved. The large-scale solution is a matter of quantity—how many places are doing good
reparative work in their own limited sphere?—rather than the quality of one big solution. If each
place joins in the work of its own place, he argues, the work is done in all places, as global
problem-solving seeks to do.
Further, being locally placed for Berry does not negate translocal solidarity and
collaboration. If a community concretely solves problems of injustice and destruction, it might
become an example which can inform other communities’ attempts at solving similar problems.
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While there is no general solution to these problems that can be followed in a top-down program,
Berry encourages the study of literature (hence his advocacy for de-specialized liberal arts and
literacy education [“In Defense of Literacy”; “The Loss of the University”) and of practical
examples from other places both to judge one’s own attempts and to consider new possibilities
for one’s own place, to use as it fits the community’s needs. Indeed, Berry rejects a community
that refuses to learn from other places and times: while he critiques the Southern Agrarian
regionalism for being displaced from their region, he also critiques a regionalism that would
refuse to incorporate knowledge from the wider world, instead praising such thinkers as Thoreau
for bringing knowledge and thought from other places to bear on his own, namely in his embrace
of Eastern philosophy (“Regional Motive” 67). Part of the problem in the degradation of
communities and ecologies is that there are very few living examples of health left to follow, and
there are not many being cultivated. Thus, instead of connecting imaginatively to examples that
can be enacted in new ways in new places, “we are left with theory and the bureaucracy and
meddling that comes with theory” (“Word and Flesh” 199). Instead, Berry advocates for a
translocal relationship of “imagination,” where what plays out locally becomes connected to
others through empathic acknowledgement and relationship (Major 120). As one is attentive to
the needs of their own place and attentive to holistic questions of “judgment” and “criticism” that
incorporate the interconnected knowledges of ecology, ethics, literature, and more, one might
then participate in larger translocal communities and discourses (Berry, “The Loss of the
University” 80-81). This for Berry is a healthy pluralism: instead of an amalgam of displaced
people, a discourse between placed, healthy, locally active communities that act in mutual
benefit and collaboration for shared aims of local health and justice (“Sex, Economy, Freedom,
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and Community” 169). Action, however, always starts and ends locally, within the bounds of a
place with the right ratio of eyes to acres.
This preference for the ordinary shapes Berry’s understanding of literature as placed
within the ordinary workings of the community. In his essay “Writer and Region,” Berry rejects
a literary regionalism that is beholden to “sentimentalization of or condescension to or apology
for a province,” arising either from the impulse to leave one’s community or from the reflections
of one who has left for “the Territory”–either geographically, in colonization or urbanization, or
ideologically, as one leaves behind the place and takes on the viewpoints of a new place (89).
Often this looks like writing literature primarily about individuals misunderstood or outcast by
the community rather than the community and the persons within it (95). He looks closely at
Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn as an ambivalent example of both a healthy relationship to
one’s region and a typical impulse to reject settlement into place. Twain, Berry argues, taught
American writers that “every writer is a regional writer,” arising from and responding to the
concerns of a particular place, even if that place is decidedly cosmopolitan (89). For most of
Huckleberry Finn, Twain, in Berry’s reading, faithfully narrates and presents his place without
sentimentality, self-consciousness, or disdain (83-84). However, Twain, like most American
writers (and citizens), comes to relinquish responsibility to his place, closing down imaginative
possibilities of placedness and attention to the ordinary (89). This happens in Huckleberry Finn
in the last chapters when Huck plans to escape the confines of civilization and head towards the
putatively uncivilized territory. Berry reads this as the refusal to see the array of possibilities
between living with the oppression and injustice in one’s community and abandoning one’s
community altogether–possibilities such as remaining and changing these structures from within
(85). In contrast to this, Berry advocates a literature that participates in its place, working in it
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and loving it, even while (contra sentimentalism) acknowledging the place’s evils and griefs
(94). This writing is not concerned with its place’s being a widely recognized “center of culture,”
instead recognizing its own place as central for its own writing (84). It pays attention to its own
place and responds to it, acknowledging that it fits into a larger literary and political picture but
giving its attention to its own concerns first and letting it find its place in these larger pictures the
transmission of texts to other places and the act of reading by otherwise placed readers, where it
might intervene in these readers’ pictures of the world.
Alongside this placed literature, which ends up connected to and transmitted within the
larger literary world, Berry prioritizes local “literature” as valuable in self-understanding and
local culture-building. Speaking of this literature by ordinary names of “songs and stories,”
Berry enlists these transacted myths and memories as weapons in the battle against destructive
abstraction: “By telling and retelling those (i.e., local] stories, people told themselves who they
were, where they were, and what they had done” (“Farming Without Farmers”). These placed
stories, which Berry addresses in the midst of an essay on local land knowledge and food
production, are erased by generalized stories of television and other global/national media. The
abstract global/national economy cannot respect these sorts of local stories and songs that cannot
be mass-produced and disseminated, and therefore it stops the transmission of these local
literatures between people and generations. Therefore, the storytellers and singers must both
fight for the survival of this art and enlist the art in the fight for the survival of local economies
(“Farming Without Farmers”)--much in the same way that Berry enlists literature in the fight
against ecological destruction. This local, ordinary literature, Berry argues, has “incalculable”
value that must be “acknowledged and respected,” told and retold as seriously as any literature
that readers insist on reading and teachers insist on teaching (“Farming Without Farmers”).
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Ordinary Placed Reading: Critique After OLP and Berry
Berry’s ethic of proximity and his advocacy of attention to one’s place mirrors the
commitment to the ordinary found in Moi’s use of OLP in literary studies. The primary assertion
of OLP–“the meaning of a word is its use”—is concretized further by Berry’s orientation to
placed natural, social and agricultural relations. The meaning of a word is mediated by place, as
words are put to use to do the things that a community needs and wants to do in response to its
people, its communal relationships, its ecologies, and its practices of food production and
consumption. This is not to say that place any more than use is a ground for the meaning of a
word; rather, a place, like use, is a condition of possibility for language use and meaning making.
A person speaks, writes, and posts from somewhere. Place, defined by relational proximity and
longevity, made up of ecological, social (broadly inclusive), and agricultural dynamics, sets the
terms for what is and can be done with language, what possibilities and limitations are placed
upon language users: my landlocked Ozarks hometown, for example, does not afford the
language of deep-sea fishing or whale watching, but instead particular practices of agriculture
and recreation arising from rocky, forested highlands–until a local transcends for a time the
Ozarks through interstate travel or internet communities. Still, however, those will be
meaningless to those around them uninitiated into those language-games and forms of life and
will remain to the initiated rather useless language distant from communities that use that
language. Words are given meaning whenever they are given use in a place, making the meaning
of the words concrete and particular. To modify the mantra of OLP: the meaning of a word is its
use in the place of its use.
This is not to say, however, that a place fixes a word’s meaning into an unchanging,
essential definition. While one’s place provides stability, it does not necessarily stagnate and
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resist any change. Berry not only expects that communities will change their practices over time
but also urges young people, in particular, to “escape” particular structures that prove to be
unjust or stifling in order to make their communities more just and humane (“Writer and Region”
84). He acknowledges that this impulse to escape certain modes of communal living is often
conflated with the impulse to escape the community altogether–a change which he does not
endorse but does acknowledge is central to the American spirit (85). Beyond these changes
within the community, changes can also happen to the community from the outside. In the era of
mass migration, both in the form of Americans migrating for work or political preferences and of
immigrants and refugees seeking safety and economic opportunity, and of mass media produced
(for most people) elsewhere and disseminated to as many places as possible, local communities
are faced with not only new words and concepts but also entirely new languages and languagegames altogether. Further, as larger systemic forces of neoliberalism, technocapitalism, and
nationalized hyper-politics (Jäger)—all of which largely play out in the a-geographical social
media world–impinge upon the local, they give immediate access to the language and practices
of places across the country and the world, obscuring the locality of the people using it. These
new translocal discourses share some similarities with the “world of literature,” as Ricœur calls
it, that connected one in their own place to faraway and fantasy places; however, the quantity and
the speed of the new discourse dissemination, namely twenty-four-hour news cycles, social
media platforms, and digital streaming services, means that it touches all in the community with
more immediacy than even mass-produced print literature can do.
All of these changes, some more constructive or destructive than others, keep
communities and their language use from crystallizing into any sort of essentialism. As new
developments happen in a community and the community needs to start doing something new,
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new (or renewed) language will be developed to do those tasks or respond to those
developments. As old practices are abandoned, whether through community disintegration or
progress towards justice and liberation, people stop using particular words to do those things.
Berry’s question about new inventions and new innovations–“What will this do to our
community?” (“Out of Your Car” 20)—does not preclude innovation at all, including innovation
in language-use. Language users oriented towards their local community will likely change more
slowly and more cautiously, but, when needed, they will change their language as new
possibilities, limitations, and challenges arise.
With this understanding of language, OLP’s grammatical investigation becomes attentive
to the criteria of a word’s use in a particular place, in a particular community. When there is
confusion over a word’s use–over what a person is doing when they use a particular word or
sentence–one is bid to ask, “what are the criteria in this community for the use of these words?”
For example, while one might consider the use of “woman” in legal discourses, or medical
discourses, or Christian theological discourses, one might also consider how the word is used in,
say, a coastal cosmopolitan city or a conservative, religious, rural town. The latter, which might
place a high value on the so-called traditional nuclear family, might think in relatively exclusive
terms about what and who constitutes a “woman,” with recourse to sexual anatomy and
traditional work and domestic roles. Meanwhile, a more progressive city might have already
questioned and problematized those traditional pictures to also problematize traditional uses of
“woman.” This description is not to say that either is right in their use of the word; it instead
gives us, as OLP seeks to give, a clear view on the source of confusion, clarifying what the
proper course of action for social progress might be in a particular place.
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This ordinary picture of language that analyzes and describes the use of language in a
place similarly redefines the task of literary studies. Literary theory and criticism, with this
picture of language, analyzes ways that literature not only represents a place but also how it acts
within and upon a place. Since all language-games are placed within a local, natural-socialagricultural community, literature, as a set of particular language-games, also arises from and
responds to the possibilities, challenges, and limitations of particular communities. Each literary
text stands as an example not just of a subjective self but of a community of people, nature, and
agriculture. These can, of course, range from examples that are more clearly based on real places
(like Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha County) to examples more loosely correlated with particular
places, like one might find in science fiction that takes place in other galaxies. Texts might
emphasize in their narrative either the individual or the community (American authors typically,
in Berry’s view, emphasizing the former [“Writer and Region” 95]). Texts might emphasize the
natural, social, or the agricultural—the social, of course, taking the lion’s share in literature due
to the vast number of subjects under this heading and the vast amount of attention given by
authors and scholars alike. Whatever an author emphasizes, the place of the author and their
configuration of place in their writing helps determine what possibilities, challenges, and
limitations the text might explore and encounter in its progression.
Each work of literature, as an example of a placed community and placed self, joins a
larger world of interconnected examples. More precisely, following Ricœur, it simultaneously
joins two larger worlds. The first is the “quasi-world of texts or literature,” where the work “is
free to enter into relation with all the other texts,” conversing with other literature in a way
similar to “living speech” (“What is a Text?” 138). This is the world of canons, forms, and
genres, where texts might be an example of a Modernist poem, or an American Gothic story, or
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well-crafted heteroglossia, or a sonnet. This world of literature, in keeping with the principles of
OLP, is not removed from the other types of language-games; it does, as many postmodern
artists have demonstrated, use and interact with other, more ordinary forms of language.
However, readers abide by the rules of literary language-games of literature that say we can and
should read literary works intertextually with other works, thereby creating this quasi-world, of
which each work contributes itself as an example.
Additionally, the literary work becomes an example of a placed community and a placed
self. This is the work that historicism and regionalism typically do, asking questions of how
literary texts represent the South, or Harlem, or Plains communities, which, in turn, become
examples of American literature. Texts, then, offer illuminations of local and regional values,
language-use, and institutions, giving coherent examples of how oppression, complicity, and
resistance play out on the ground in concrete, particular examples. None of these, as OLP argues,
can, even in concert with each other, conclusively conceptualize “American literature,” or any of
the various forms of oppression. Instead, they become examples of these in open-ended,
interconnected networks of texts with varying degrees of shared features, without consciousness
of or reference to a conceptual center. These works become examples of how Americans
diversely think, act, and write, helping to form the plurality of places that Berry advocates (“Sex,
Economy, Freedom, and Community” 168). In this pluralist network of placed literature, the
works converse with each other through a reader's act of reading and placing texts in intertextual
dialogue with one another. In this networked reading, readers, in Latour’s and Felski’s terms,
attach and detach those works to and from themselves as they resonate with the work.
This plurality of examples, however, is an incomplete picture of literary texts. In
Latourian terms, this refuses the acknowledgement of a work’s status as hybrid, subject-object
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actant, emphasizing only the objective aspect of the work. As an actant in the reader’s network,
literature also has a subjective, active aspect. This active aspect, as Ricœur notes, is “actualized”
in the act of reading (“What is a Text?” 146). This picture of a literary text as action, as we have
seen, is Moi’s primary focus, calling this action both “expression” and “intervention”
(Revolution 196, “‘Nothing is Hidden’” 36). In this active, subjective role, a literary work, in its
natural-social-agricultural place, both expresses this place to an otherwise placed (but perhaps
similarly placed) reader and intervenes in that placed reader’s own local state of affairs.
Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons,” the interchange between a work’s viewpoints and valuations
(and prejudices) of the world and the reader’s (273), is initiated by the read text: in Ricœur’s
analysis, interpretation is “less an act on the text, than an act of the text” (“What is a Text?” 148).
This act is upon the reader who, by virtue of attentive, reflective reading, allows the text to act
upon them.
Importantly, this act does not happen only to a solipsistic, isolated individual. In the same
way that, for Berry, communal needs and solutions mediate public discourse on sexuality and
private sexual intercourse (“Sex, Economy, Freedom, and Community” 119), the needs and
norms of the local, natural-social- agricultural community of the reader mediates the public
literary and political “worlds” and the private act of reading. The public, for Berry is ageographical, translocal, and national. He relates it, fittingly enough, to the “republic,” involving
institutions, systems, and events “about which the public can confidently know” (“Sex,
Economy, Freedom, and Community” 119, 118). Examples might include government, national
economy, or political discourse. Communities, by contrast, are limited in geographic scope to
those who live in a place together, a “locally understood interdependence of local people, local
culture, local economy and local nature” (“Sex, Economy, Freedom, and Community 120). This
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is not necessarily the same thing as an interpretive community, in Stanley Fish’s sense: first,
because it is much less concerned with epistemological communities than with geographical,
ecological communities. Second, as with other theoretical concepts, deferring to “interpretive
communities” re-enacts the “craving for generality” that risks ignoring or oversimplifying the
particular examples that trouble the conceptual category. Third, and most important for my
analysis, because this conception typically pictures readers and texts objectively, as passive,
acted-upon entities–the writer and reader are constructed and, therefore, bound within limits. As
we have seen, while this objective passivity is certainly part of the ontology of both persons and
texts, both readers and texts are also in part active and able to, in the fusion of horizons,
challenge and reconfigure these interpretive constructs to a greater degree than the concept of
interpretive communities typically allows. The concept of the interpretive community primarily
explains one direction of the act of reading: the movement from the public through the
community to the reader, which misses the active and responsive movement from the private
reading to the community and, ultimately, to the public.
Instead, community mediation serves primarily to concretize the ways that a text’s
concerns fuse with the reader’s place’s concerns. In a work that explores, for instance, a
Victorian “angel in the house” who despises the lifestyle she is forced into, a reader reading in
this Berrian, ordinary spirit, taking this text to be the expression of a localized example of
oppressive domesticity, turns not to general theories of patriarchy and domesticity but to the
ways that the language of gender is used there and the ways that their neighbors are privileged or
oppressed by these particular uses of language. The text, then, as an action, intervenes for the
reader in the state of affairs for cis women in that place, demonstrating how and why certain
taken-for-granted practices are in reality damaging and, in some cases, introducing new
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practices, both language and otherwise, that might be liberatory. Of course, as an example, these
new possibilities are not conclusive; the work is still there to explore if it connects with the
community needs. As an example, however, it can help the reader re-think and re-view their own
place.
A literary work, then, is a hybrid subjective-objective actant in the local, natural-socialagricultural network around the placed reader, both belonging to and used by the reader and
acting upon the reader, expressing its concerns to them and intervening in their practices and
relations. Similarly, the reader is a hybrid subject-object, both acting upon the work by choosing
it, purchasing it, attaching to it, and citing it (or not doing these), and being acted upon by the
book. As we have seen, suspicious critique (and most critical theory) tends to narrowly focus on
the subjective critic and the passive text and, at the same time, on unknowing readers who are
passive before active ideologies in the passive text. I do not wish here to render critique passive
and unknowing; instead, in the realistic spirit of OLP and the prioritization of the local by Berry,
I wish to prioritize “look[ing] and see[ing]” (Moi, Revolution 63) both the particular placed
action of the text and the particular placed needs of the reader’s community–a spirit neither
merely active nor passive but collaborative, marked by acknowledgement and the interchange
between reader and text.
The attentive acknowledgement that Moi posits for reading, the “just and loving gaze”
upon the concrete, particular details of the text that responds to the perceived action of the text,
is, when done with a Berrian spirit, attentive both to the place that the text expresses and to the
place which the reader inhabits. An ordinary reader in this sense gives attention to the text’s
concerns and to their own concerns, as Moi says, but they also attend to their community’s
concerns. This, as we have seen, will include much of what currently constitutes regionalism and

54

place studies. It will also include a regionalist inquiry into the reader’s place, as the reader
studies and better understands the concerns and challenges in their own natural-socialagricultural community, giving attention to how stories, songs, and other language-games are
used in the world they bodily inhabit–creating, as it were, a sort of dialectical regionalism: an
attentive description of the interchange of language use and forms of life between a literary work
and a reader’s world, in a focused, attentive manner and an acknowledgement of (i.e., a response
to) the ways that work and the world intervene in each other’s horizons. This attention to the
place and text are, obviously, still done through the subjective position of the individual–one
attends to their community and the text as a person of a particular gender, race, class, etc., which
draws the reader’s attention to certain language-use or textual features that someone who exists
otherwise might not notice.3 As Best and Marcus note, a reader’s subjectivity respective to their
community (and, I argue, the subjectivity of a place, respective to the wider world) might
illuminate or obscure different aspects of the work or the world (18). Therefore, the placed
reader will, to varying degrees, interrogate the text and be interrogated by the text. This doubly
attentive, dialectical regionalism is a hallmark of Berry’s writing, as he considers how languageuse by industrialists and imperialists directly impact his Port Royal community, and of Moi’s
writing, as she considers the challenge to language presented by the 2011 terrorist attack in her
native Norway, which, as attacks like this do, leave communities at a loss for words (Revolution
222-242). Readers in this ordinary spirit are bid (to lightly alter Karl Barth’s admonition) to take
their novel and take their local newspaper and read both (“Barth in Retirement”).
The attention to the work itself, for OLP, pictures engagement with the text as an
adventure. Reading as adventure, as Moi shows, is a collaborative process: the reader goes with
the work (or the author, protagonist or narrator–readers can attach to any of these) almost as a
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passenger, while the reader also actively responds to, empathizes with, objects to, and questions
the work (“Adventure of Reading” 136). The adventure, broadly speaking, is from confusion (the
conflict in the text and perplexity for the reader) to clarity (resolution in the text and
understanding in the reader) (“‘Nothing is Hidden’” 36). For the reader, the adventure of reading
anything remotely complex only begins with the reading of the text, and it continues as the
reader revisits the text to better understand how and why the work of literature worked out the
way that it did, and the consequences and implications of such a work that unfolded in such a
way (38). The reader, following the text, attentively asks “Why this?” and attentively traces the
unfolding answer, coming to a sense of clarity about the text’s expressive act.4
In this dialectical regionalism, the adventure of reading is extended into the adventure of
life in a local place. This does not mean a historical metanarrative; instead, this refers to the
narrativity that Louis Mink identifies as central to comprehending memory and history, the
“grasping together” of successive events into a “single image”—comprehending the successive
years from the 1830s to the turn of the twentieth century as one Victorian era, for instance, or
comprehending 365 successive days as one present year (547). As humans, we organize and
divide events into narratives, even if they do not reach the level of a Marxist or Christian grand
narrative, both in our past (where Mink focuses) and, often, in the present. I, for example, am in
the midst of an era comprehended as my 20s, or my graduate studies, or my time in Springfield,
comprehended as a discrete narrative but one that is ongoing. These comprehended narratives
come with their own challenges, possibilities, and limitations, and, therefore, can be pictured as
an adventure in much the same way as reading literature–instead of collaborating with the
author, one instead collaborates with the Actor-Network in which they find themselves and
which they create.
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Here the adventure of reading literature might intervene in the adventure of community
life. As one comprehends the characters, settings, social formations, and narratives of literary
works, these can reframe and reconfigure the people, places, social formations, and ongoing
action of community life. Ricœur recognizes in the act of reading the “round-about way of
understanding…the cultural signs in which the self contemplates himself and forms himself”
(“What is a Text?” 145)—the re-viewing and re-imagining of the actants in the reader’s network,
imaginatively recasting our world according to the new things known from literature. This
happens when someone is called “quixotic”: the character and story of Don Quixote becomes a
way of recognizing the impractical, idealistic person, helping understand the ways of being and
the ways of living that come with being quixotic–for better or worse. As a reader becomes open
to how certain modes of using language and certain modes of acting shape the places expressed
in literature, they can appropriate new possibilities for seeing and responding to their own place.5
As readers ask, “why this?” with the details of the text, they can more attentively ask “why this?”
of the different practices and features of their own place. Readers not only go on the adventure in
the text but go on the adventure of communal life with the text in their network as they go.
This reshapes the task of critical theorists and literary scholars who, going beyond
attentive reading, write critically about literary works, eras, authors, themes, or
political/theoretical concerns. OLP promotes theoryless reading, starting with a work, author, or
literary era that leaves them with questions, working from the work through the work to clarity
(Moi, “‘Nothing is Hidden’” 38). Instead of starting with a theory, one starts with their placed
self and the perplexing work. For well-read, well-trained scholars and theorists, bringing
themselves to the text brings a lot of knowledge, both about literature (formal, historical, poetic
knowledge) and about their primary political concerns (what resides in the realm of “theory,”
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e.g., feminism, disability theory, queer theory). However, in a Berrian picture of critical reading,
the reader must also bring with them what is known about their place: how is language used
here? What are the concerns, values, and aims of people here? How is this place organized
geographically, socially, economically? What picture of gender, race, class do people here have?
How do people here exploit other people here, and how do other, larger forces exploit or destroy
this place? These concerns, far from a general theory of social formation and oppression, can
give shape to the aspects of texts that draw a reader’s attention and confusion. Instead of treating
the text as a proof or disproof of a theory, these concerns give us a starting point for the text to
unfold its own concerns.
The act of critical writing, then, becomes a description of the fusion of horizons between
placed literature and placed critics. The critic, knowing the literary work, their political concerns,
and their place, offers their reading as an example of the expression and intervention that
literature does in the natural, social, and agricultural dynamics of their place, illuminating certain
shortcomings and blind spots in the formations and practices of their own community. Further,
the placed reader, knowing how oppression and injustice are happening in their place, can
illuminate shortcomings and blind spots in the work: where a work maybe puts too much trust in
industrialism, an Appalachian or Ozarkian critic might work to explain how such industrialism
ignores the destruction done in their own place and the widespread poverty it leaves in its wake.
Both work and world fuse in the act of reading, and the critic offers their description of that
fusion, not to build a theory but to add an example to the open, diverse polyphony of examples.
One does not have to ignore what we call theory altogether. As postcritical scholars
insist, critical theory has contributed vital information to understanding social, economic,
cultural, and environmental discourse and the workings of oppression. If a scholar interested in
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gender studies and queer theory hopes to gain clarity on the (to them) perplexing relationship
between two male characters in a novel, they might turn to queer theory and theories of
homosociality for help. This, however, is in the service of getting clear on the relationship in
question; the work’s own unfolding of its concerns still guides the process, rather than the
theory. The work might offer itself as an example of a homosocial erotic triangle, or it might not.
In certain uses of language, and in certain places, this homosociality might unfold as Sedgwick
describes, and in some language-uses it might not. This neither proves nor disproves Sedgwick’s
theory. Again, OLP is not interested in theory for theory’s sake. Rather, the work and the place
offer an example of a different form of life, of a different language-game, or of a different place,
which requires its own description.
This locally situated, placed scholarship is difficult to do. It is easy, in the era of online
communities, translocal academic communities, and national/global economies, to abstract social
formations and oppression into general theories that we suppose hold true everywhere. There is,
of course, some merit to this. The forces of economic and cultural imperialism, which the
Internet and global economics have enabled, have produced an increasingly homogenized world,
where people develop identity, community, and culture “without resort to geography” (Berry,
“Writer and Region” 92). This homogenization includes prejudices and oppressive practices. A
White supremacist in, say, the Pacific Northwest can get on the same page with a White
supremacist in Georgia or Great Britain with relative ease. In such a homogenized world it is
easier to say that something can be true both everywhere and nowhere in particular. Critical
theorists can, it seems, more easily make authoritative theoretical claims that are universal and
detached from their actual place.
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However, this detachment ignores the fact that, despite the translocal communities of
social media and academia, people, and theorists still live in communities with particular
ecologies and agricultures. Our immediate environment should and does shape the responses we
have to literature and cultural criticism. Most of this current chapter has been written as I work a
temporary job at the local Park Board, where I have heard the unmasked bigotry and far-Right
paranoia taking over the rural Ozarks, as well as my relative powerlessness to confront these as I
work at the lowest rung of the workplace hierarchy. How could this not shape my response to
critique and to Berry’s fiction as much as Felski, Sedgwick, and Moi do? Like any other reader, I
am inescapably placed, and this helps shape my responses to literature, no matter how
disinterested and detached I pretend to be. To pretend, however, is to be dishonest, as dishonest
as to pretend I do not read BIPOC authors as a White person. Instead, in the freedom of honesty,
I can embrace my placedness, considering how texts intervene in my life in this place and
responding in this place, for the social transformation of this place.
Furthermore, theorists and scholars might consider these homogenizing forces and the
ways that they impact their local place. This work, already being done by postcolonial scholars
and Indigenous activists, is also a focus of Berry’s: when discussing large-scale homogenizing
forces, he demonstrates their injustices and destruction not in the abstract but in the effects on
Port Royal in Eastern Kentucky, where he lives. The problem with “national thinkers” that Berry
identifies is that they abuse places far away from their own: “A landfill in my county receives
daily many truckloads of garbage from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. This is
evidently all right with everybody but those of us who live here” (“Out of Your Car” 19).
Readers are bid to consider how the language-games, practices, and formations of these

60

translocal, abstracting, homogenizing forces are changing (or are being resisted by) the languagegames, practices, and formations of the local natural-social-agricultural community.
This orientation to the language and practices of the local can, of course, fall victim to an
affective, romantic subjectivism that obscures the sort of clarity that criticism desires. However,
as postcritical theorists argue, critics, by merit of being human beings, are affective beings, and
bring certain affections to their work: a love for People of Color, or LGBTQ people, or women; a
repulsion towards oppression, hierarchy, and injustice; a desire for a more just and equitable
world. These already impinge upon their work; the work of reading in this placed, ordinary spirit
would be to concretize these affections as towards a place and from a place, as the work of
advocacy for marginalized people in the community (people already identified by theorists) and
for marginalized communities within larger socioeconomic forces becomes the affective drive
for literary and cultural theory. This affection reminds one of their responsibilities to their place,
and the people there. Concrete, loving, responsible action can only take place in a place, and this
emphasis on the local can help reconnect researchers to their students and English Departments
to their communities.
This responsibility will require much from literary critics. We will have to, in Berry’s
words, “get out of [our] spaceship, out of [our] car, off [our] horse”—that is, our empyrean
departments and campuses–“and walk over the ground” (“Out of Your Car” 20). We will have
to, in some ways, un-discipline, working closely with and using those fields that already analyze
language use in particular places, like sociolinguistics, English Education, even journalism–even,
perhaps, schools of agriculture–to get clear on the concerns of our own places. We will have to
put our local politics on par with the larger, more abstract national/global politics, trusting and
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imagining that our work, as an example of just and equitable action, will join the plurality of just
and equitable activisms in other places.
This ordinary placed reading is, I hope to demonstrate, a way of doing literary studies
that can better respond to the challenges of the twenty-first century that I have delineated in the
previous chapter. In the following chapter, I will attend to Berry’s protagonist Jayber Crow as an
exemplary placed reader, tracing his attentiveness to the ordinary language, practices, and
residents (human and otherwise) of the Port William Membership as well as his attentiveness to
the abstract forces and institutions that threaten Port William. I will describe Jayber’s own sense
of adventure as one leading back to a place, rather than into a new place or into displacement. I
will conclude by laying out the ways that, I believe, reading in this ordinary, placed spirit can
respond to the political and cultural challenges outlined in the first chapter, to give an account for
some of the generative possibilities of this particular way of reading.
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READING FROM THE BARBERSHOP: JAYBER CROW AS PLACED READER

As we have seen, Wendell Berry’s emphasis on one’s place as the site of responsible
social analysis and activism is consistent with OLP’s commitment to concrete, particular
language use and forms of life as the privileged site of literary and cultural analysis. Berry, like
Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Moi, prioritizes thinking through examples over the “craving for
generality” often found in literary criticism. This recourse to abstraction is, in part, the target of
Berry’s preface in Jayber Crow; it is one of the modes of reading, alongside unwavering
suspicion, that he bids readers to set aside before reading. This craving for generality is described
(and decried) by Berry as “attempting to find a ‘text’ [or] a ‘subtext’” in Jayber Crow; in other
words, attempting to read against the grain of his novel in order to expose oppressive social
formations and ideologies (Berry, Jayber Crow). Berry, as an environmental activist, has no
problem exposing such formations in his writing, particularly in his nonfiction. However, in this
warning he advocates a new way of interpreting these oppressive, exploitative systems. He does
this through Jayber, the namesake and narrator of Jayber Crow. Jayber, through whom the events
of the novel are comprehended and interpreted for the reader, models the way of interpreting the
world for which OLP and Berry advocate. He is an example of an ordinary placed reader, who
gives attention to and describes the forms of life, language-games, and communal networks of
his place and the way that they are reconfigured and ultimately dissolved by various twentiethcentury political, economic, and technological developments. His description of the
reconfiguration of his place–which he makes a text through his narration–intervenes in the
dominant horizon of twentieth-century political, economic, and technological change, which
foregrounds national progress and growth and the dominant narrative (i.e., the history), of these

63

changes which construes these developments as universally positive. Instead of generating his
own all-encompassing theory of twentieth-century history and technology, he fuses the horizon
of his own particular place with the horizon of nationalist and industrialist discourses, offering
his own place as an example of the consequences of these changes for communities like his own.
Jayber Crow, published in 2000, is Berry’s ninth published book in his Port William
series. This series, beginning with his 1960 novel, Nathan Coulter, and continuing through How
It Went, a collection of short stories expected in late Fall 2022, narrates the lives and memories
of Port William residents from the Civil War into the late twentieth century. Port William, a
fictional town located on the Kentucky River in Eastern Kentucky, is a primarily agrarian rural
town, where residents have longstanding genealogical connections to the community, handing
down businesses and farmsteads from generation to generation. The various novels and stories of
Port William narrate both the happenings of this community and the changes to and challenges
faced by this community as American economic, technological, and agricultural developments
reconfigure the cultural traditions and economic vitality of Port William.
Jayber Crow is the barber for Port William. The novel, narrated in 1986 when Jayber is
seventy-two and semi-retired (Jayber Crow 12), is Jayber’s recollection of and reflection upon
his own life from his birth to the time of his telling. Jayber (whose first name is Jonah) is born on
August 3rd, 1914 (“one day…before the beginning of total war” [11]) in Goforth, Kentucky, a
small town a couple of miles from Port William with social and economic connections to Port
William. Both of his parents die on the same day in February 1918, and the orphaned Jayber is
adopted by his great-aunt and great-uncle, Cordelia and Otha Dagget, whom he calls Aunt
Cordie and Uncle Othy, and lives with them in Squire’s Landing, about two miles away, where
they farm and own a store that sells goods that the town could not farm for itself. Jayber lives
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with them, farming, helping out with the store, and observing with fascination the Kentucky
River (both its natural beauty and the people it brings by the landing), until Aunt Cordie and
Uncle Othy die about one year apart, leaving Jayber orphaned again at the age of ten.
He is sent to live at an orphanage far from Port William, where he develops an
introverted, observational, contemplative personality, a strong distaste for institutions, a love for
literature, and rudimentary barbering skills. While there, he thinks (though with misgivings) that
he might be called by God into Christian ministry and goes to seminary on scholarship upon
graduating the orphanage’s school. However, once he is there, his questions about theology and
ethics convince him that he cannot be a preacher, and at the advice of his New Testament Greek
professor, he drops out of seminary with the recognition that he must “live…out” the questions
in order to (possibly) find answers. He leaves for Lexington, where he works at the stockyards
before getting a job as a barber and taking literature courses at a public university.
Then, without much explanation or rationale, he leaves Lexington during a Kentucky
River flood and, though initially headed for Louisville, decides to return to Port William,
following the flooded river until he arrives close to Squire’s Landing. He meets Burley Coulter,
who takes him to Port William and helps him acquire the recently vacated barber’s shop to open
his barbering business. Jayber remains Port William’s barber until he retires. He becomes a part
of the community, participating in its social life and giving up his ambition of making something
of himself. He is attentive to the forms of life and the transmitted stories of Port William through
his work and his friendships with Port William men, such as Burley Coulter. Two main sources
of conflict animate the rest of the novel: the degradation of the town in the face of the political
and economic developments of modernity and his unrequited love for Mattie Chatham.
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As his life unfolds, Jayber observes and reflects upon the changes that modernity brings
to Port William. He attempts to enlist in the military during World War II but is excluded
because of a heart condition. He then observes how the town experiences foreboding and grief,
as it sends its young men to World War II (and later the Vietnam War) and hears back about
their deaths. He reflects as he remembers, questioning what role love (and a God of love) can
have in a world of hatred and violence. He also watches as Port William’s economy, culture, and
agriculture are destroyed by a homogenized national economy, recognizing that Port William’s
prospects of future stability and prosperity are bleak.
Jayber also narrates his unrequited love for Mattie Chatham. He first notices her when
she is a child (as Mattie Keith) as someone with remarkable perception and tenderness. He soon
meets Troy Chatham, her high school sweetheart, and dislikes him for his arrogance, wondering
how Mattie has come to love him. Troy and Mattie eventually marry, and they move onto the
Keith farm. Her father, Athey, is a successful small-scale farmer with a symbiotic relationship
with his farmland, livestock, and crops. Troy dismisses Athey’s ethic of care, instead working to
maximize the land’s output, which includes using heavy machinery, working longer hours,
taking out loans, and creating monocultures. This leads to conflict between Athey and Troy, with
Mattie caught between her husband and the ethic she shares with her father. Troy is given more
power to implement changes as Athey ages; meanwhile, Mattie continues the caring, responsible
ethic of her father. Jayber sees her caring for young children at a church event and falls in love
with her. He recognizes that this is a passion that he cannot act upon and works to suppress it as
best as he can. Then, when he is at a Christmas party in Hargrave, he witnesses Troy cheating on
Mattie with another woman. He decides to secretly commit himself to Mattie as a faithful
husband, even though she cannot be his wife, in order to prove to himself that Mattie could have
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a faithful husband. Committing to Mattie, he ends his romantic flings with other women. As
Troy is destroying most of the farm and accumulating debt, Jayber and Mattie run into each other
in the Nest Egg, a parcel of forest that Athey has left in his will to Mattie to save it from
deforestation. They both escape from their respective troubles by taking contemplative walks in
the Nest Egg, and the two occasionally see each other there, though without planning to do so
and without romance. Mattie becomes terminally ill, and in desperation for money Troy levels
the Nest Egg (359). Jayber sees Troy in this desperate state and finds himself with only
sympathy for Troy in place of his long-held hatred (361). Jayber visits Mattie in the hospital,
where he does not say how he feels but is able to experience her tenderness in their last
interaction (363).
He tells his life not as a simple chronology of events but as a memory, a comprehended
(in Mink’s sense of “grasp[ed] together”) singular whole. Because of this, his narration is
interpolated with stories of others, stories from others, and his own reflections on events from his
own life. He foreshadows the importance of an event in the light of a yet-untold event.
Sometimes he comments on the understanding of the event or era that he had in the past,
contrasting it with the way he understands it at his present, older state of mind. He also includes
stories and perspectives from the time he is narrating that he has heard from others. His story
takes place within the network of Port William memories and his own reflection of his place
within this history, and his narration reflects this interplay between himself, his community, and
the larger world.
Jayber thus inevitably narrates change in his mode of interpreting the world: he moves
from an institution-induced craving for generality that confuses him–i.e., that prevents him from
interpreting his world and his own situation within it–to a placed reading which enables him to

67

interpret himself and his world. This new mode of interpretation helps Jayber work to get clear
on the causes and consequences of twentieth century historical events and technological
development. His early life, as he identifies those questions which perplex him, is captive to a
displaced, disengaged “craving for generality,” the desire to conceptualize the world through
abstraction and all-encompassing explanations (Moi, Revolution 92). In his time within the
conservative institutions of the orphanage and seminary, he takes a typically suspicious position
from which to interpret the workings of the institution: a stance of disengaged but antagonistic
resistance, standing separate from the institution while problematizing and deconstructing its
social and epistemological formulations. He embraces this upon his arrival at the university, and
for a time loves the disengaged stance it promotes and the democratic, anti-authoritarian social
formations that it offers. Yet here too he finds what Wittgenstein calls a “contemptuous attitude
towards the particular case,” the assumption that constructing a universal explanation under
which to subsume disparate phenomena is the goal of one’s studies (Revolution 92). This
contempt leaves him mired in confusion, and it is only in his commitment to study his identity
and his world through sustained, attentive, reflective engagement with a natural-socialagricultural place that he begins to get clear on these questions. He does not answer them or
extrapolate any universal theories from his experience; instead, he offers his recollection of his
life as an example of one moving from confusion to clarity in place and as an example of a
place’s relationship with larger sociopolitical forces.

Jayber in School: Displacement and the Craving for Generality
Jayber compares his two experiences of institutional education: one with conservative
Christian schools (an orphanage school, Good Shepherd, and a seminary, Pigeonville College)
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and the other with a public university, where he takes literature courses. In both of these, though
they are set in opposition to each other, he finds a similar bent towards abstraction and
generality: an abstraction that arises from a lack of attentive acknowledgement to the naturalsocial-agricultural place to which the schools belong and to the particular persons that belong to
them. His life in these institutions cultivates in him a similar recourse to disengaged, displaced
abstraction, as he embodies the characteristics of a suspicious critical reader: a reader who,
disentangling themselves (as best as possible) from their situated subjectivity, works against the
oppression of so-called commonsense knowledge and sociality and works towards theories that
undermine and problematize the formations they oppose. Neither space, for him, brings clarity;
that is, neither offers an understanding of himself or his world in which he recognizes himself or
is made ready to act responsively in the world. Instead, their pictures of selves and world are, to
use Wittgenstein’s phrase, “on holiday” (Revolution 48), removing persons from the world in
which they will act and giving pictures of the world that are not responsive to the place where
they will live.
In his experience at the Christian schools, he is taught the theories and doctrines of
conservative Christianity as the key for interpreting himself and his world. Upon arriving, he
realizes that he is now displaced, disconnected from the world he has known; he is “in another
world,” a world that for the longest time makes him “[feel] like he might be nowhere” (Berry,
Jayber Crow 30, 37). In this disconnected world, he is instructed in abstract propositions about
God, the world, and himself. He is implicitly taught the binaries at the heart of Good Shepherd’s
dogma–order/disorder, soul/body, institution/nature, the latter terms being the loci of sin–that
order the world of Good Shepherd and, the school claims, the entire world (32). These settled
doctrines are taken by the teachers at Good Shepherd to be the theoretical key to understanding
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oneself and one’s world. As Jayber enters Pigeonville College for ministry training, he finds
these same theories reinforced. Even as he has “doctrinal trouble” in the form of doubts about the
Bible’s inerrancy and the church’s application of Jesus’ teachings, he finds these abstract,
propositional teachings reinforced as so-called answers to his questions: “They told me I needed
to have more faith…to believe…to pray…to give up my questioning” (49, 52). These attempts to
reinscribe the questioned doctrines are, Jayber recognizes, due to the professors’ habitation
solely within their dogmas and theories (52). The professors are unable to respond to a particular
student with particular concerns on particular teachings, instead giving recourse to the
propositions that are giving Jayber so much trouble. Their answers are tautological: the way to
stop doubting is to stop doubting; the answer to “what is the point of praying to Him at all?” is to
pray more (51-52). There is no room for confusion as a starting point; these professors begin
with the sure footing of a doctrine and move through questions and interpretation to demonstrate
the proposition, leaving little room for confusion or surprise when engaging in the act of reading
either culture or literary texts. Generalized theories of infallibility and belief become the
beginning and end of interpretation, where knowingness and vigilance against surprise become
the key traits for readers to embody.
Jayber, thrown into these institutions after early experiences in placed, relational
networks of affection, tries to resist this institutionalization through remembering his past. He
holds to his memories of Uncle Othy and Aunt Cordie, remembering them before he falls asleep
at night–remembering the land and the house as it was then (36). He attaches these memories to
his picture of “home” to resist the orphanage's attempts to become home to him and erase his
past (36). He reenacts these memories by making frequent escapes into both Canefield (the town
adjacent to Good Shepherd) and into the surrounding countryside. These, for him, reenact the
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free exploration of nature and the neighborly “free and casual comings and goings” of his life at
Squire’s Landing, where entanglement in communal networks shaped his identity, rather than
disentangled abstractions that he finds at his schools (40-41). The remembering and reenacting
protect his placed identity from homogenization: he is from a place with its own natural, social,
and agricultural configuration, connected (even through memory) with particular people, despite
the attempts to replace these with abstract notions of students, sinners, and saved souls.
Jayber also resists this institutional homogenization through reading literature. At Good
Shepherd, he recognizes himself in many of the stories that he reads: he is drawn to stories of
William Green Hill, Tom Sawyer, Huckleberry Finn and David Copperfield, all orphans with
whom he resonates, and to picture books of World War I, which help him better understand the
conditions into which he is born (34-35). At Pigeonville College, he contrasts his experiences
reading the stories of the Gospels with the doctrines of St. Paul; when he reads the Gospels, he
can “imagine them…just shut [his] eyes and see,” and these stories offer him a more compelling
theology than abstract doctrines after the tradition of St. Paul (50). This rift between, on the one
hand, the stories that shape his perception of himself and, on the other hand, the doctrines that
fail to formulate a recognizable picture of self or world gives rise to his doubts of the theories
from the institution–his “doctrinal trouble” (49). These stories he reads form for him a network
of images and narratives to help him frame his own experiences, becoming the “selfinterpretation of a subject” that, Ricœur argues, is simultaneous with the interpretation of a text
(“What is a Text?” 145). This developing network of images and narratives perplexes him as he
forms it within the institutions yet in contrast with the institutions’ doctrines, leaving him with
confusion and questions.
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Stories and memories constitute for Jayber a modicum of resistance to the
homogenization and theorization of these conservative schools. However, despite his resistance,
he comes to embody a displaced, antagonistic spirit from which to interpret and resist these
institutions; in so doing, he reinforces their craving for generality instead of undoing it. Instead
of being a placed, embedded person to resist abstraction, he takes on a disengaged stance toward
his world; in a world “turned inward” upon itself (Berry, Jayber Crow 40), he mimics the turn
inward, taking on a “solitary” stance towards the discourse of the orphanage, “looking out,
seeing much, revealing little” (38). This world turned inward, with its arbitrary distinctions and
definitions regarding order, disorder, nature, and culture, is artificial to Jayber, “not present
unless [he] watched it” (32). Because of this, he in his solitary stance makes the habit of
disengagement and suspicion, forming few connections with others with whom he might have
solidarity and community (38).
From this displaced stance, he cannot fully resist the craving for generality of the
orphanage. He passively accepts the orphanage’s practice of renaming students, erasing his given
name, Jonah, and instead naming him J. This practice, he recognizes, homogenizes the students
by erasing their origins, making them “faceless…no longer the persons [they] had been” (31).
Soon, he no longer can understand who he is by the name used by his parents and adoptive
parents and goes by the orphanage’s imposed name “J.” well after his time at the orphanage,
accepting this imposed alienation from his place and family of birth. His own history, fading the
longer he is embedded in the Christian schools, is partly replaced by his “local histor[y]”
constructed within the orphanage (38). As his past recedes in his memory, he can only remember
it as it was when he lived there, with no connection to the place as it presently exists (37). While
important in his efforts to resist homogenization, his pre-orphanage memory offers little more
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than nostalgia with little connection to the present, living memory of the place. Even his
questions, while asked of particular gaps and inconsistencies in the conservative doctrines of
these schools, are asked in general, theorizable ways: instead of in response to particular enemies
or wars, he asks if Christians can hate enemies or go to war. While pushing towards particulars,
the questions remain at the level of the abstract, rather than the level of observed language-use,
networks, or forms of life.
Without belonging to a place, Jayber must more or less accept the foundation of
displacement into which he is thrown, even as he tries to negate many of the epistemological
claims of these institutions. Moi notes a similar tendency in poststructuralist deconstruction: it
rests on the same assumptions of generalized conceptual absolutes as the epistemologies and
systems it hopes to deconstruct by forming generalized concepts for its negation of
commonsense and closure (“They Practice Their Trades in Different Worlds” 806-13). As long
as he is not embedded in a natural-social-agricultural place and attentive to its forms of life,
Jayber must accept the abstraction of the Christian schools, negating its generalized claims in
oppositional generalities. Where Good Shepherd homogenizes students into its disengaged
world, Jayber distances himself not only from this particular world but from any placed world, a
self-styled free subject with no history, connection, or obligations. His efforts, then, to critique
and resist the school’s epistemology leave unchallenged the displaced, disengaged, ontology that
they prescribe as well.
With such an institutionalized experience at Good Shepherd and Pigeonville College that
is subject to rigid dogmas, the public university in Lexington offers a disengaged stance towards
the world from which to interpret, and act within, the world. While still at Good Shepherd,
Jayber begins to embody the disengaged, antagonistic stance of suspicious critique, beginning
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the work of questioning and problematizing its commonsense institutions and social formations.
He moves to Lexington and enrolls in college with hope of freeing himself from his past, and is
in some ways successful: after claiming for himself freedom from history or constraint (On a
registration form: “Parents? None. Religion? None.…Sex? Yes”), he enrolls in literature courses
to read and talk about books, which he could rarely do at the orphanage (Berry, Jayber Crow 69).
He enjoys the exposure to the wide world of literature and to “the forbidden”—i.e., so-called
sinful behaviors banned by the Christian institutions–and generally enjoys the freedom from the
constraints and dogmas of Good Shepherd and Pigeonville (68). His action is unregulated, and
the university presents itself as more democratic, without authority figures observing and
disciplining its students (70). The university represents a break with tradition, positioning itself
as “a threat to conventional wisdom,” that offers “freedom for thought and study and
experimentation,” problematizing and disrupting the doctrines of conservatism and
experimenting with new ways of being (70). He is free, unbound from commitment and able to
dismantle and reconfigure his picture of self and world as he sees fit. He has found a place that
matches his critical, suspicious spirit.
However, Jayber realizes that, despite the university’s freedom from rigid doctrines, it
(and he) is still bound to the same craving for generality and lack of attention to its place that
infects the orphanage and seminary, blocking the way for clarity on identity and meaning for
Jayber. While the university is “trying to be the world of the future” beyond dogma and doctrine,
as opposed to “the world of the past” that Good Shepherd and Pigeonville are trying to preserve,
it shares the Christian schools’ failure to acknowledge of the particulars of its place and its
students: “It was an island too, a floating or a flying island. It was preparing people from the
world of the past for the world of the future, and what was missing was the world of the present,
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where every body was living its…only life” (71). For many scholars and students, including
himself, “they were not going to school to learn where they were, let alone the pleasures and
pains of being there, or what ought to be said there” (160). The university is “a world unto
itself,” developing students not to become members of any place but to take on the picture of the
future that the university imagined (70). In the rush for an abstractly defined progress, the
university forgoes attention to its place, overlooking the particular needs of that place.
This lack of attention to particulars of its place means that Jayber makes no progress in
moving through his confusion to clarity. None of his questions that so troubled him at Good
Shepherd and Pigeonville are attended to at the university; in fact, while he learns everything he
possibly can about literature and reads as many books as he can, in his classes he does not ask his
questions or express his confusion (69). He recognizes that, because of the “aloofness,” the lack
of concern and attention from the school and its professors, he is becoming a person “from
nowhere…a theoretical person from the sticks, who one day would go to a theoretical
somewhere and make a theoretical something of himself,” who exists without any sustained,
affective ties to a place or a community (73). At the university he is no closer to clarity on his
understanding of himself or his world; instead, he finds only a solipsistic so-called freedom,
where he is not acknowledged beyond a universalized free subjectivity. His own questions about
his identity, world, or fate are not answered, as the university is interested in only the universal
future it is creating and the homogenized students it is creating for that future.
The disinterested, disengaged, displaced stance of the university is, per the suspicious
hermeneutics of critique, the way to get free from biases and affective fallacies and rationally
analyze and critique issues of identity and knowledge. He is promised freedom from constraint,
“freedom for thought and study and experimentation” (70). Jayber does achieve this freedom,
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becoming a disengaged subject unbound from many of the doctrines of his youth, able to observe
and listen to the world from a disengaged position. Yet this freedom releases him into a new
abstraction: the abstraction from responsibility to and relationships within a particular place,
leaving him without any identity or direction beyond being “a theoretical person from the sticks,
who one day would go to a theoretical somewhere and make a theoretical something of himself”
(73). He is free to deconstruct those concepts and constructs imputed to him at Good Shepherd
and Pigeonville, but this brings him again to the craving for generality, with new yet still
theoretical concepts, leaving him as perplexed and alone as before, unable to think and act within
the world. He has no ties in Lexington, so he decides one day to leave, with no explanation and,
it seems, with no consequences for himself or Lexington (74). As he leaves, he is caught up in
the flooding of the Kentucky River, numbered among the refugees displaced from their farms
and homes, finding shelter with them in the capitol building in Frankfort (80). He partially
recognizes his psychological state in the material state of the refugees: like them, he is displaced;
unlike them, he was not placed before the flood, and therefore has lost nothing (81). This partial
recognition, where he sees what he is and what he is missing, reroutes his journey from
Louisville to Port William, where he supposes he might find a place in which to belong (82).
In the midst of this abstraction and disengagement, Jayber has two experiences that open
for him an alternative to generality and call him back to a placed, ordinary reading of the world.
First, while he is at Pigeonville College, asking his doctrinal questions to no avail, he finally
turns to Dr. Ardmire, the feared New Testament Greek professor. He asks his questions and
admits that he has no answers–no satisfactory doctrine or theory to turn to for certainty (53-54).
Then, Ardmire opens an alternative way to get clear on these issues and questions: one does not
start with a theory and reinforce or refute it through the act of reading but instead prioritizes
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confusion and attention as a starting place for inquiry. He advises Jayber, “You have been given
questions to which you cannot be given answers. You will have to live them out–perhaps a little
at a time” (54). Instead of starting with a doctrine and laboring to demonstrate it (as his other
professors recommend), Ardmire suggests that Jayber might take his confusion as a starting point
to pay attention to what he does and what happens to him, not to formulate theories of ontology
or epistemology to replace the conservative ones but to comprehend, interpret, and describe
himself and his world through his connections with a place and with others.
Second, Jayber experiences generosity at the expense of suspicion. While leaving
Pigeonville College, he hitches a ride from Port Williamite Sam Hanks. Though he knows who
Sam is, Jayber lies about his connection to Sam and about his purpose for going to Lexington; he
tells Sam that he is from Bell’s Fork, that his mother is dying, and that he is going to Lexington
to find work to support her. Sam gives him advice on where to find work in the city and upon
arrival secretly slips a five-dollar bill in Jayber’s pocket (59-60). Jayber, though deceitful, is met
not with suspicion but with what Moi calls acknowledgement, “our response to the expressions
and actions of another” (Moi, Revolution 208). This kind of acknowledgement is not necessarily
naïve: Sam tells Jayber that “there’s bastards in this world that would cut your throat for a
quarter” (Berry, Jayber Crow 60). He has knowledge and (economic) power, giving him freedom
to act towards Jayber however he wants. In his freedom he chooses generosity over certainty or
skepticism regarding Jayber’s situation, establishing a bond of responsibility with him. This
relational bond, of two persons responsible for each other (as well as his shame for denying this
bond with his lies) is in part what leads Jayber back to Port William, where he had known these
bonds from an early age (82).
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Jayber in Port William: Placed Reader
As Jayber returns to the Port William Membership, becoming the town barber and a
participant in the town’s life and history, he begins to embody the stance and practices of an
Ordinary Placed reader. Instead of keeping a “critical distance,” disengaging from the ordinary
forms of life and relational networks of the community, he becomes embedded and participatory
in the community, reading it from his embedded position. Instead of giving recourse to abstract,
theoretical knowledge, he embraces the limited and specific horizon of his place, interpreting
larger historical and systemic forces through the dialectical interventions between those forces
and the life of Port William. This knowledge is not treated as a theory, in the sense of attempting
to subsume discrete phenomena under a single explanation or set of explanations. Instead, he
offers this knowledge as an example of a particular place’s life and response to the changes of
the twentieth century, allowing his example to intervene in otherwise-placed (or national)
horizons and interpretations of the twentieth century in the United States.
Jayber, after embodying a critical distance from his world in order to interpret it, comes
to read his natural-social-agricultural place from within, from a position embedded in the forms
of life and language-games–“the town’s ever-continuing conversation about itself” (121). This
embeddedness allows him to interpret the twentieth century clearly from his particular horizon.
His attentive gaze has been honed by his time at Good Shepherd and his practice of reading
literature. This attentiveness remains crucial for his ongoing attempts to understand his world;
however, this disposition can only bring (albeit partial) clarity when he focuses it upon a
relatively limited sphere–what Berry elsewhere calls a reasonable “eyes-to-acres ratio”
(“Farming Without Farmers”).
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He begins to interpret his world not as a disinterested subject but as an ordinary member
of Port William. He takes up work as a barber, the vocation that has financially supported him
during his studies. In doing so, he forsakes any disengaged, critical position–as “a preacher or a
teacher or a student or a traveler–and becomes “classified” by the community as “Port William’s
bachelor barber” (Jayber Crow 123). Upon this classification, he gives up his so-called freedom
of disengagement and displacement and accepts that this is his home, where he will stay–and
stay he does, remaining in this role officially for thirty-two years and unofficially for another
seventeen (3, 12). This means that, like the other lifelong residents of Port William, he
“belong[s] to it, economically and otherwise”—that is, his fate and responsibility are identified
with the town’s fate and its needs (4). It also means that he is a “participant and subject in the
town’s ever-continuing conversation about itself,” both actively and passively co-constructing its
history and meaning with his fellow Port Williamites (121). He replaces the critical distance of
an outsider with the embeddedness of an insider and participant, forming attachments instead of
detachment, and interprets Port William’s natural, social, and agricultural formations from
within.
Alongside this embeddedness, Jayber practices attention, reflection, and description of
the world in which he is embedded, all of which are crucial to this ordinary placed reading.
When he returns to Port William, it takes him a while to become fully embedded: he is first a
“stranger” to the town and then, for some time after, is a “bystander” requiring “a long time
before [he is] involved” in the town’s life (123). This is partly due to his own habits of
bystanding, but it is more so due to some of the prejudices in the town. As a barber whose shop
is “a precinct strictly masculine except on Saturday morning” and who is known to participate in
the water drinking (i.e., whiskey drinking) parties with many of the other townsmen, he is
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generally excluded from forms of life predominantly involving women (123). This includes,
readers learn later, most of the town’s Christian religious forms of life (159). As a relatively poor
and unattractive bachelor, he is excluded from forms of life of courtship, marriage, and
reproduction, forcing him to “pursue…bachelor’s aims and satisfactions,” aims that further
stigmatize and exclude him from these forms of life (122-23). As an unsteadily employed barber,
he is excluded from language-games and discourse about work (122). Indeed, though he is “glad
to be classified,” in Port William, he recognizes that he is “in a class by [him]self,” embedded
yet “bystander,” attending to the town from both within and to the side (123). This ambivalent
semi-excluded embeddedness allows Jayber to maintain a watchful, attentive gaze instead of the
uncritical, unreflective mode of life of his neighbors who live without much thought to their
daily lives (121). He observes the town from a stance of affection and obligation, taking upon
himself the responsibility of “keep[ing] an eye on the town” from his shop in downtown Port
William or from beside the main drag when he has no customers (4). This affords him a vantage
point from which to read Port William and see how its life unfolds. Instead of watching the
institution and taking a disengaged stance against it, he is able to give attention to the ordinary
networks, forms of life, language-games, and histories that make up the natural, social, and
agricultural place of Port William.

Port William: The Place Read
As an old man at the time of narration, Jayber is telling his narrative as a memory, as
things that have mostly passed, with the exception of his occasional present reflection. His
attention to the ordinary has already happened, and his narration in his present (1986 [12]) is
more precisely his retention of the ordinary in memory; he has collected the observations, and
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now he recollects them. Jayber through his narration gives attention to the totality of his
memories, tracing the way that, as a totality, it has constructed his identity and his world. He
recollects and reflects upon his memory so that he might comprehend himself from discrete
memories, even where that necessitates acknowledging the irreconcilable fragmentation of some
memories to his self-interpretation.
This work of remembering and comprehending is, for Jayber, the work of constructing
Port William’s history. Paul Ricœur in Memory, History, and Forgetting describes the different
ways we use the language and the different objects of memory. He offers a spectrum of
“memories,” or the “thing intended” in the act of remembering (22). On one end is remembering
“states of affairs,” or “generalities” about the past (23). These are a person’s remembering the
way things were and the way things happened in the most general terms (23-24). On the other
end is remembering “singular, unrepeatable events,” stories that stand out as happening at a
particular time and place and happening in a particular way (23). Near this end of the spectrum
are events that a person remembers because they are familiar, because “they reappear as being
the same” many times over (23). These are events that are remembered due to the quantity of
happenings, their “emblematic character” alongside the quality of the event (23). Ricœur notes
that, in the construction of “historical knowledge,” the particular memories–singular and
emblematic–“link up” with the general “states of affairs,” creating a “propositional form”
typically found when one does history (24). That is, from singular events, a historian creates
general formulations about historical eras, ages, periods, and the like.
This linking up is, to an extent, what Jayber does with his recollected narrative. He
attends to and retains the stories of Port William–“its living memory” of events singular and
emblematic–and comprehends them as the “history”--the states of affairs across generations–of
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Port William (Berry, Jayber Crow 3). Jayber considers himself a historian, not in the sense of
constructing more general knowledge about eras and ages but in the sense of curating memories.
For him a place’s history is its network of memories: “[Port William’s] history was its living
memory of itself, which passed over the years like a moving beam of light” (3). He rejects
creation myths, origin theories, or teleological theories of progress or decline: “It had a
beginning that it had forgotten, and would have an end that it did not know” (3). This history is
passed through oral storytelling between people and across generations, leaving Port William
with “little written history,” and instead with networks of remembered stories of people, places,
and events (3). This is where Jayber’s narration intervenes: as curator of discrete stories of Port
William, he can describe and clarify Port William’s place in the political, economic, and
agricultural changes of the 20th Century, understanding what has happened and is happening to
it and intervening in the dominant historical understanding of this time, reframing this picture
according to its impact on rural agrarian places, of which Port William serves as an example.
The memories that Jayber recalls fall into roughly two categories: memories that others
have passed along to him and memories of his own experiences and observations. These taken
together form the history of Port William: a coherent comprehension of Port William as a place,
which then affords the possibility of interpretability, or understanding the interventions between
national and systemic forces and the placed community of Port William. These remembered
stories inundate the novel, as they are interpolated at frequent intervals in the main narrative of
Jayber’s resettlement in Port William and his unrequited but faithful love for Mattie Chatham.
Because of this, I will focus on a few of these memories, namely Chapter 1 for Jayber’s own
memories and the transmitted memories of Mat Feltner, as exemplary cases while also
considering the effect of incorporating so many seeming asides within the novel.
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As one who attends to the words and practices of others as an embedded outsider, Jayber
holds the recollected stories of others in his own memory, transmitting them to his own audience
in his own recollections. He notes the special attention he pays to the older men that frequent his
shop: these men are “rememberers, carrying in their living thoughts all the history that such
places as Port William ever have” (126). Through these rememberers, Jayber “remember[s] old
men who remembered the Civil War…hav[ing] in [his] mind word-of-mouth memories more
than a hundred years old” (352). These men, both in the barbershop and in other public spaces,
tell stories of themselves and of others they have known. Sometimes these men tell their stories
as they come to them: Athey Keith, for example, tells his stories in fragments, picking them up in
medias res as they come to his mind, leaving Jayber to put the fragments together (for example, a
story of pseudo-Klansmen–who terrorize whiskey makers and drinkers instead Black people–
interrupting a hog-killing that twelve-year-old Athey was charged to oversee). Some stories are
told when landmarks evoke attached memories. These memories are predominantly transmitted
spontaneously, requiring the attention and retention of Jayber to be preserved.
One such memory transmitted spontaneously is Mat Feltner’s recollection of a Civil War
era pair of siblings, Ive and Verna Rowanberry. Ive joined the Confederate Army with little
political investment in their cause, but he is captured on the way to enlist and becomes
embittered towards the Union during his prisoner of war internment. Verna, meanwhile, married
a man who fought and died for the Union Army. These two siblings held a grudge against each
other, never speaking to each other again until Ive passed her in a store and did not recognize
her, asking the store clerk “Who was that old woman?” (203-04). This memory is evoked by
Mat’s ritual of cleaning up the graves of his family’s deceased, particularly those who he knew
personally or heard of through transmitted stories (201-02). Jayber collects, recollects, and
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reflects upon this memory: surely, despite Ive and Verna’s hatred, there was “somebody who
loved them both” (205). While this family was fractured by hatred, they were still bound by the
“membership” of Port William, the relational, “frayed and always fraying, incomplete and yet
ever-holding bonds of the various sorts of affection,” that create and constitute the place of Port
William (205). Mat’s remembering and transmitting this story, and Jayber’s own remembrance
and transmission, are their attempts at fidelity to description of the placehood–the identity of the
place–of Port William that is constructed through its remembered people, places and practices,
and the relational bonds of affection and responsibility created between these.
In addition to the memories of others, Jayber offers his own recollected memories,
contributing to the network of living memory that constitutes the history of Port William. This
begins in the first chapter, emphasizing this history-telling purpose in writing before taking up
his narration of his own life. As we have seen, he has made a habit out of finding a vantage point
from which to observe the town and pay attention to what he sees. Most of what he sees he does
not transmit, but he does describe some “astonishing sights” (5). These astonishing sights are
moments that stand out to him from within the ordinary life of the town. These are discrete
memories with little superficial connection: a plumber pulls a prank on the town mechanic by
sticking a plunger to his bald head; Fee Berlew, kicked out of his house for the night due to
drunkenness, dances in the street and barely escapes being hit by a car; the son of the town
banker uses his violin as a baseball bat on his way to violin lessons; an old man carries his few
possessions between his adult daughters’ houses, whom he stays with in rotation, himself being
homeless; Fee Berlew is kicked out of Jayber’s barbershop for (once again) drunken
disorderliness and stands outside hurling insults all night until he is sober, then going back to
reconcile with Jayber (5-8).
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These “astonishing sights” erupt out of the ordinary forms of life of the place–a prank as
one works in a mechanic shop, and a verbal altercation as another works in a barbershop; a
pickup baseball game and music lessons–and out of the ordinary relations of the place–spouses,
parents and children, teacher and student. This emphasis on the ordinary is far from nostalgic or
utopic. Later stories contribute memories of injustices, evils, and griefs, such as the story of Ive
and Verna or the memory of a lynching of a young Black servant (250). Instead, the emphasis
here is on the prioritization of the relationships between people over time, their lives together of
practices and language. This is most clearly demonstrated in the second memory of Fee Berlew,
where he is thrown out of the barbershop. The insults he uses arise from his knowledge of
Jayber’s past: he calls Jayber a “clabber-headed stray” and “an orphan three days shy of a
bastard” (7). Jayber is, in fact, an orphan, as both his parents and his adoptive parents died when
he was three and ten, respectively. He was, more or less, three days shy of a bastard: he notes
that his parents’ marriage was a “have-to case,” that they married after becoming pregnant with
him–which everybody knew and gossiped about, so Jayber knew of this from an early age, too
(13). These insults from Fee are particularly mean because he knows Jayber well; a person can
best insult those whom they best know. Yet Jayber’s knowledge of Fee affords the possibility of
repair. This dynamic–hurt and repair within sustained relationships–constitutes the drama of
most of the memories that Jayber recollects and transmits (we will turn to the main aberration
from this in the next section). In transmitting his own recollections, Jayber offers his own
contribution to the living memory of Port William, connecting his attention to his own life to the
attention others give to their own lives in previous eras to further construct Port William’s
history.
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These memories, both his original and his secondhand (even thirdhand) stories, describe
individual relationships and forms of life; however, the totality of memories, anthologized and
presented as a whole by Crow, constitutes the network of placed relationships–between natural,
social, and agricultural entities–that constitute Port William. Individual memories crowd around
and sometimes crowd out Jayber’s narration of his own life: characters are introduced into his
narrative with a memory that introduces him; characters tell stories, and Jayber pauses his own
narration to tell one, two, or more of these. They, plus Jayber’s reflection, are vast in number,
making a comprehensive analysis of all of them overwhelming. This sheer vastness of speech
acts is reminiscent of what Serpell notices in her phenomenology of cliché: the effect of these
semantically empty clichés, she argues, is achieved “by gathering” them, in “heaping” one upon
another ad nauseam (174). As clichés are heaped, they impose their sheer quantity upon the
interlocutor, “spilling beyond the bounds of communication” with “an insistent materiality” that
impresses itself upon the interlocutor’s affect (174). The work is done upon the hearer of clichés
(when one uses them for manipulation, as in The Killer Inside Me, which Serpell analyzes) by
quantity of words, not quality. Jayber’s memories are, of course, more meaningful than wellrehearsed clichés–although he does hint at the regular rehearsal of the stories transmitted in the
town, as well as his rehearsed reflection upon them (Berry, Jayber Crow 256, 16). The quantity
of the stories, then, complements instead of replaces the semantic quality of them: each is
meaningful on its own, and as a heap it is meaningful. This heap of stories–stories of forms of
life and relationships and events within these relationships–are “link[ed] up, in Ricœur’s words
(Memory, History, Forgetting 4), to construct Port William as a natural-social-agricultural place,
a network of the relations of members across all three of these realms across time. The history,
the “living memory of itself,” is this gathering and arranging of the memories, of which Jayber
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faithfully (albeit by his own description incompletely [13]) describes and arranges. In short, this
recollected, gathered, arranged network of memories is the disclosure of Port William as a place,
comprehended as a whole from disparate events happening in place.
With this disclosure of the place is the disclosure of its horizon, which foregrounds the
sustenance and repair (i.e., the health) of symbiotic, responsible relationships within and across
the natural, social, and agricultural realms. It foregrounds independence from other places and
interdependence upon members to meet the places needs, as much as possible. It backgrounds,
then, the imagined communities of national culture and economics, accessing these only as
mediated through the community–in stores like Othy’s for instance. It has its own blind spots,
such as the inability to consistently extend equality to its Black members, or the lack of foresight
to see its own demise in modernity and act against it (Berry, Jayber Crow 121, 279). However,
as we will see in the next section, what it does see and concern itself with sits in the background
of the horizon of the minds behind economic and technological innovators that foreground a
homogenized national progress.

Port William and the Nation: Placed Reading as Intervention
Thus far, I have outlined the objective aspect of Jayber’s curated, organized recollection
of the living memory of Port William. These stories are held together for him as a comprehended
whole, open for close reading, analysis, and critique, if he (or us, as readers) would like. Yet, as I
argue in my previous chapter, literary works also have a subjective aspect, intervening in the
state of affairs of a reader’s place through a fusion of horizons, enacting in the act of reading. As
Ricœur argues, interpretation is “an act of the text” (“What is a Text?” 150). The act of Jayber’s
anthology of Port William’s memory is its intervention in the picture of twentieth century
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history–that is, the dominant remembered and told configuration of technological and political
events and their consequences for the world. This dominant picture foregrounds a universalized
notion of national progress, which primarily denotes unlimited economic growth. In place of this
universalizing picture, Jayber interprets these events from his limited position, describing this
progress through their effect on Port William. This, in turn, becomes Berry’s own intervention in
this same history: in creating a fictional but realistic rural Kentucky town, he offers this place as
an example of such rural agrarian Southern towns, fusing the horizons of such rural farming
communities with that of a hegemonic political discourse that has constructed a homogenized
national history. Jayber, as an ordinary placed reader, describes this fusion by interpreting
national history through the consequences for and responses of his local place.
Jayber fuses the national and local horizons across several distinct but interrelated
historical themes: war, changes in agricultural ideology and practice, developments in interstate
travel, economic practice, and policy. Each of these spans across the interlocked natural, social,
and agricultural realms. For the purposes of this analysis, I will focus on the fusion of horizons
regarding developments in interstate travel in the twentieth century, which Crow connects to the
causes and consequences of interstate travel. Jayber interprets these developments in their
consequences for the natural, social, and agricultural life of Port William, intervening in pictures
that frame these as national progress.
Translocal travel is, in Jayber’s youth and before, relatively limited, creating a Port
William that is both relatively independent and self-sustaining and constrained by the limits of its
environment. Port William’s connection to the wider world in Jayber’s youth is primarily
determined by the Kentucky River. He recognizes that, at the time he begins barbering, Port
William is relatively self-sufficient: “the people of the town still belonged to it, economically
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and otherwise” (Berry, Jayber Crow 4). Its source of economic and cultural connection to the
wider world is the Kentucky River. Aunt Cordie and Uncle Othy run a store at a landing, selling
goods that could not be produced locally (20). These goods are brought to Squires Landing by
steamboats that travel the Kentucky River. Alongside these goods, travelers from all over the
region and country pass through, as well as troupes of musicians and actors (18-19). The river is
for Port William “a barrier and yet a connection”: while it brings goods and culture from the
wider world, it also protects the self-sustenance of Port William, requiring the town to produce a
majority of its own food and culture (18). The river “shape[s] the land,” determining the
possibilities and limitations for translocal forms of life (18). There are roads that enable this
connection to the wider world; Port Williamite Sam Hanks is driving fattened hogs to market in
Lexington when Jayber hitches a ride with him (57). However, the use of these roads is subjected
to the natural landscape: roads typically go from the river to the town to bring things from the
river to the town, and vice versa, the river being the road that connects communities (166).
The Kentucky River and the natural landscape of Kentucky limit Port William’s access to
other places and, therefore, limit its dependence on other places, allowing it to cultivate its own
networks, forms of life, and language-games in response to its own particular needs and
concerns. Because of this, it retains its history (as we have already seen), its dialect (127), its
music (128), and its leisurely entertainment (166). The local is foregrounded, and the national
(the “imagined” [Anderson 6]) is mediated to people through the local. In its picture of the
world, the health of the community (both its human and nonhuman members) is foregrounded
and protected.
These networks and forms of life are what Jayber attends to as Port William encounters
the forces of homogenization and nationalization that promise possibilities of identity
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construction that transcend the limitations of one’s local place. Two pictures of the world–on the
one hand Port William, with its own horizon and concerns, and on the other hand the national
economy with its own horizon and concerns–are pitted against each other in the development and
refinement of interstate infrastructure and vehicles. Jayber does not refute the picture of this
economic system with propositions or theories of mass transit; instead, he describes its
consequences upon the people and networks within his place, intervening in the assumptions
implicit in this universalizing, homogenizing picture: the assumption that this new mode of
economic and cultural connectivity–and the new modes of limitless identity construction it
affords–is equally progress for Americans everywhere. Jayber interprets these developments
according to their consequences for this relatively independent, self-sustaining national-socialagricultural place.
The promise of transcendent identity construction implicit in this new mode of travel is
alluring to many young Port Williamites, Jayber included. Jayber describes the effect that the
expansion of cars and roads has on the ways that Port Williamites spend their weekend nights.
After World War II, a road is constructed that goes from Port William to the larger Hargrave,
replacing the time-consuming method of riding a boat on the river to travel from one to the other
(Berry, Jayber Crow 166). Because of this, the region “open[s] up,” allowing much quicker
travel between the two (166). The result is that younger Port Williamites go to Hargrave for
weekend leisure, displacing the “old homemade Saturday nights” of Port William for an
otherwise-placed source of leisure (166). Jayber is initially allured by this promise as well,
despite his earlier contentment with his placement in Port William. He justifies his participation
in this because he wishes to go where he can transcend his “ineligibility” with which Port
William has classified him and actualize his “waking dreams” of romantic and sexual
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involvement with women (171). This hope for transcendence leads Jayber to go beyond the
limits of his place, utilizing translocal travel to do this. However, this illusion is shattered when
he sees Troy cheating on Mattie (the woman whom Jayber secretly loves) at a Hargrave
Christmas party. He already deeply dislikes Troy, whom he knows is using heavy machinery to
destroy the farm that his father-in-law has passed on to him, arrogantly chasing dreams of wealth
at the expense of his family and his land. When Jayber sees Troy in Hargrave, he recognizes that
Troy, like himself, is a “dreamer” that neglects fidelity to his family or to his farm in order to
chase desires beyond the limitations and needs of his place–a dreaming that brought both of them
to Hargrave and away from Port William (241). He knows from seeing the destruction that
Troy’s dreaming has wrought on his farm that technology-enabled transcendence is a possible
danger to the health of Port William, Therefore, he swears off this dreaming, leaving his car in
Hargrave and never owning one again (254). He recognizes that he is eschewing progress, but
instead he allows Port William and the larger world to grow back to the proportions of his
childhood, with Port William foregrounded and the national backgrounded (254).
In his commitment to Port William, he reinterprets the interstate system according to its
consequences for Port William. Free from his own illusions of transcendence, he sees clearly
some of the byproducts of interstate travel: while an individual can construct their identity
limitlessly, a place with limited resources and a lack of adaptability is destroyed, losing whatever
self-sustenance and independence it once had. He characterizes these roads similarly to “The
War” and “The Economy,” which he calls “freestanding creatures” and “independent operators”
(273). This free, independent entity destroys the Port William in which Jayber is embedded,
unraveling its local networks. Jayber describes natural destruction: “It [the interstate] interrupted
the flow of water through the veins of the rock. … Big bulldozers cut the land away down to the
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rock. Power drills bit into the rock. Explosions cracked and shook the rock and the pieces were
hauled away” (281). The roads once were subject to the limits of the river and the landscape, but
now the natural world is subjected to the road that is “a great stroke of pure geometry cut through
the country” (281). He describes social dissolvement: “It divided neighbor from neighbor. It
made distant what had been close, and close what had been distant” (281). As young people
pursue opportunities beyond Port William, businesses and farms shut down because younger
people that might continue their work are leaving to move elsewhere, choosing high-pay and
low-responsibility work over modest work that is committed to the needs of Port William (274).
He describes agricultural degradation: “The interstate cut through farms” in the same way that it
cut through the river (281). It allows citizens of Louisville to recreate Port William as a suburb
with housing developments, driving up the cost of farmland (282). The history of Port William is
erased “This one, this great casting away of the earth, respected no presence, no limits. It
remembered nothing. …Places where lives had been lived disappeared from the face of the
world forever” (281). The transcendence and limitless growth that ease of interstate travel
promises leaves Port William unable to sustain independent natural, social, and agricultural
networks.
Jayber’s horizon, which foregrounds Port William’s natural-social-agricultural health,
fuses with the horizon of powerful political and economic institutions, which foregrounds
subjective individuality and the maximization of financial profit and individual autonomy. With
this horizon people might throw off the concerns of their place and construct themselves through
an array of choices beyond what their place offers. This horizon relegates the health of particular
natural-social-agricultural places to the background. Jayber intervenes in this relegation by
describing what he sees: a force of homogenization destroying unique placed communities. He
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does not negate this other horizon with any sort of generalities about the interstate system or
theories of nationalism or capitalism; he does not abstract Port William’s condition into a
statement about rurality or agriculture. He discloses Port William, a place with its own networks
and forms of life, to his readers as an example of a place that is displaced and dissolved by the
technologies of the twentieth century.
Importantly, these consequences are not hidden or repressed. These consequences are
clear, in plain view of those attentive to the place. Port William’s old men watch it happen, as
construction workers flippantly dispose of expensive and perfectly usable machinery that slows
their progress (281). Milo Settle experiences it whenever his Port William store has its supply of
gasoline discontinued in favor of interstate gas stations (282). To the Port Williamites, (to use
Wittgenstein’s words), “nothing is hidden” (Moi, “‘Nothing is Hidden’” 36); the consequences
are not covert, only unacknowledged. Jayber, by describing these developments from an
embedded position, invites his interlocutors to acknowledge what is happening, confronting the
dominant horizon’s refusal to see what is lost in its picture of progress.
Again, this intervention does not replace or negate any theories of progress. It does not
make Port William the center of any picture of the world, except to its own members. Jayber
does not castigate cities or governments per se, only inasmuch as they might make themselves a
center for everyone else. Instead, Port William, as a fictional but realistic Kentucky town, serves
as an example of the consequences of these developments. It bids otherwise placed readers to
acknowledge the consequences for small Kentucky towns similar to Port William, allowing these
places’ picture of progress to intervene and reconfigure their understanding of such 20th Century
developments as the interstate system and the impact on their own communities of these same
developments. It joins other interventions from other places that might have similar or markedly
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different experiences, opening up space for acknowledging the different pictures of these 20th
Century developments in a plurality of intervention in the universalized picture of 20th Century
progress.
Jayber’s shift from displaced, disengaged reader to placed reader affords him the
possibility of interpretation and advocacy that would be obscured by displacement: a clear view
of the changes to a place as forces of a nationalized economy and culture reconfigure its life and
networks. His subjectivity and his limited viewpoint–which, we must remember, is continually
augmented with the literature he reads–enables responsible, affectionate attention to the changes
to Port William that cannot be detected by powers that can only view Port William as “a black
period about the size of the one that ends a sentence” (139). From here he can see and remember
Port William, offering a retelling of the twentieth century to intervene in the dominant picture of
history. He stands as an exemplary reader of one’s ordinary place that resists the impulse towards
disengaged, disembodied critique that constructs homogenizing all-encompassing theories as a
goal for reading and interpreting.
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ORDINARY PLACED READING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

In devoting the previous chapter to describing Jayber’s position and practices of
interpretation, I am aware that I have not enacted the dialectical regionalism which I delineated
in Chapter Two, which calls for describing the intervention between the work’s place and the
reader’s place. While I do not embark on that particular adventure of reading, as Moi calls it, I
hope here instead to briefly describe the trailhead of such an endeavor–that is, the line of inquiry
with which this interpretive practice begins.
My attraction to this novel is, I confess, largely due to my self-recognition in the self and
world Berry depicts here. Recognition, Felski notes, is a potent (albeit, theorists have shown,
fallible) means by which literature intervenes in a person’s or community’s state of affairs (Uses
23-50). While Felski focuses the phenomenon of recognition on the personal and social levels,
one can recognize their place in the ecological and agricultural realms as well. In Jayber Crow,
the relationships between towns and cities in a region that are reconfigured by the highway
system are recognizable to many who have grown up in rural American communities. My own
birthplace–Neosho, in Southwest Missouri–bears many similarities in this way to Port William:
it is connected by Interstate 49 to Joplin, a larger town where many Neosho residents go to spend
their money and leisure time. Joplin, in turn, is connected to Springfield by Interstate 44, where
the major state university of Southern Missouri (Missouri State) is located. Larger still is Kansas
City and St. Louis, where many who go to Missouri State move after graduating, if, of course,
they remain in state. This parallel configuration–Port William-Hargrave-Lexington-Louisville
and Neosho-Joplin-Springfield-Kansas City–is recognizable to me; Berry’s intervention, then, is
reframing the multistep ascendency from Neosho/Port William to Kansas City/Louisville (a path
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usually framed with the free entrepreneurial subject in the foreground) to put rural communal
health in the foreground, reframing the Interstate system according to its consequences for Port
William/Neosho instead of the opportunities afforded for Jayber/Ozark residents looking for
advancement. This reframing is not a conclusive judgment on the Interstate system; it does,
however, complicate the narrative of economic progress for both the nation and for individual
subjects, giving a fuller picture of what might be lost in our quest for progress, and the costs of
losing such things. This isn’t to say the only way to live ethically is to stay in the town of one’s
birth. It is to say, however, that only with this fuller picture might one responsibly make choices
about where they go or stay and how they engage with the community in which they live, asking
of new technology Berry’s question, “What will this do to our community?” alongside questions
of what it can do for one’s own goals of self-advancement (“Out of Your Car” 20).
In intervening thus, Berry’s work calls for a response, in the form of acknowledgement or
dismissal. This responsive reading is what Cavell and Moi call for in the practice of
acknowledgement, of responding to what one sees in the action of the other (Moi, Revolution
205). Literary scholars might acknowledge this intervention in their own writing and teaching: in
writing by describing the fusion of the novel’s horizon and their own place’s horizon regarding
the concerns of the text (e.g., interstate travel and community dissolution), illuminating the way
it reframes what is happening in the scholar’s community; in teaching by challenging students in
literature classrooms to rethink the logic of rural-to-urban (to suburban?) mobility through the
literature that they read in literature programs. The responses are varied, by scholar, by place,
and by historical moment, but as Berry intervenes in the logic of interstate mobility in Jayber
Crow, a literary scholar reading in the spirit of OLP might acknowledge the intervention of the
literary work in the world with their own response.
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The question which I have been attempting to answer in my analysis of Moi’s Ordinary
Language Philosophy and Berry’s attention to place is Felski’s “how else might we read if we
were not ordained to read suspiciously” (“Suspicious Minds” 232)? I considered three features of
social and political formations in the twenty-first century that critique, dominated by suspicious
hermeneutics, often struggles to adequately respond to: post-normative neoliberalism, Far-Right
appropriation of suspicion, and self-consciously visible political violence. I am under no illusion
that ordinary placed reading or a dialectical regionalism will solve these challenges completely,
as though all we have been missing in the fight against neoliberalism and aggressively regressive
politics is to give better attention to place or region. Nor do I think this is the only generative
mode of reading: as I have said, there is still much to be suspicious of, and therefore immense
utility and vitality in suspicious hermeneutics. I also recognize the ongoing merit of trustful
hermeneutics and strands of postcritique besides those using OLP. However, I think that a turn
towards reading in place and towards picturing texts as actions in the world holds promise in
rethinking our engagement with these challenges.

Post-Normative Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism, in its post-normative formation, primarily tasks itself with clearing away
inhibition and intervention from the social field in order to let the profit motive reign. Individual
persons, conceiving of themselves as free entrepreneurial subjects, are empowered to selfconsciously construct their identities through amassing as many relevant skills and relationships
as possible out of the wide array of passive objects in order to maximize their own version of
profit (Greenwald Smith). For neoliberals, “your network is your net worth” (Gale); that is, one
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finds success in one’s ability to attach to themselves as many advantageous objects (skills,
technologies, persons) as possible.
Huehls argues that, since suspicious critique offers little in the way of truly dismantling
this ontological-administrative formation, critical theorists and literary authors instead might
(and, at least among some authors, have already begun to) accept the notion that meaning (even
for literature) is, in the neoliberal age, bound up in where and to whom something is transmitted.
Accepting this, they might strategically embed themselves as actors within the social field,
making meaning through the transmission and attachment of language and literature within
networks (in the Latourian sense of including human and nonhuman actors) instead of through
disengagement and representation. From here, authors and critics might give attention to
networks that already exist and strategically reconfigure/reconstruct their own networks in order
to enact progressive ends of collective justice, equity, and holistic health: “Initial steps [to effect
meaningful resistance to neoliberalism] might include altering the given configuration of specific
social, economic, and cultural formations; rearranging the established distribution of bodies; and
reshaping geographies of inclusion and exclusion” (Huehls 19). The paradigm for this is the
politician who connects across party and special interest lines for small, successive,
compromising progressive steps rather than the revolutionary who separates from the world in
order to offer polemic and utopic demands (21). The end goal for the revolutionary and the
politician might be the same, but one works from disengagement and the other from
embeddedness and network connections. While the embedded critic-activist might risk
complicity with neoliberalism, Huehls argues that unworking neoliberalism will likely come via
configuring networks and alliances through neoliberal entrepreneurialism that unravel
neoliberalism from within (19).
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Ordinary Language Philosophy in many ways contributes to this strategic work. By
treating literature as language-games within the world, it pictures texts not just as actions but
actors which readers may attach to themselves and use, in neoliberal fashion, for certain ends.
The literary work, in turn, might be said to use readers, in the sense that an author’s vision of
particular social formations and practices are enacted in the world through the reader whose aims
are reshaped by the literature. All of this is contingent upon the choice of the self-constructed
entrepreneurial subject to attach the work to their network identity.
Ordinary placed reading offers a tangible site for these attempts at reconfiguring
networks towards progressive ends. I have advocated here for a turn towards literary and cultural
studies that embraces the relatively limited position within a natural-social-agricultural place and
analyzes both literature and social formations from that place’s horizon. This turn necessitates
scholars’ enmeshment in communities, which acknowledges community members as subjectobject hybrids. Indeed, the neoliberal free entrepreneurial subject and the neoliberal
homogenized cog-in-the-machine object, the two purified ontological poles between which
neoliberalism vacillates, can only remain purified when persons are abstracted from placed
communities. Embeddedness in place, with longstanding ecological, social and agricultural
relations, enables one to see the ways these relations construct persons as both subjects and
objects, as “subjects and participants in the town’s ever-continuing conversation about itself”
(Berry, Jayber Crow 121). Jayber is never in doubt that he is both subjective actor and actedupon object within the network that is Port William, and, as we have seen, it is precisely as this
embedded hybrid being that his own epistemological endeavors can be undertaken. The
emphasis on place prevents an ontological craving for generality that abstracts people into
subjects and objects, instead formulating an ontology that takes environmental and social
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particulars into account. Literary and cultural theorists might similarly do their critical work from
within their own place through forging networks there, within the university and within the wider
natural-social-agricultural community. This work is, of course, already starting to happen, as
English departments take works formerly considered “low culture” as objects of study or study
literature interdisciplinarily, in dialogue with medicine, science, or the environment. This work,
however, can be further turned toward the local, as literary theorists build new networks of
attachments within the ordinary life and networks of actors in a place.
From these attachments, new, surprising connections and avenues of transmission might
be made. Scholars bring literature and cultural critique with them, meaning that, through the
connections they develop, literary works might be transmitted to community members,
intervening in members’ understandings of their ecology, of their buying and spending choices,
or of the marginalized members of the community. At the same time, these connections allow the
transmission of local knowledge and forms of life that might intervene in the theorist’s readings
of literature and culture. This forging of these networks would require theorists to accept a
hybrid critical position, giving up the view from nowhere and embracing a place within the
community. However, in trading this disengaged position for an embedded position and
reconfiguring networks for transmitting the knowledge gained from literary and cultural studies,
I believe, as Huehls suggests, that such reconfigurations, while risking complicity with the
entrepreneurial ontology of neoliberalism (or appearing resigned to incrementalism), can create
surprising networks for the transmission of literature, critical theory, and local knowledge, which
can create new, insightful, transformative readings of literature and culture for unworking the
destructive consequences of neoliberalism, White supremacy, nationalism, and more.
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Far-Right Suspicion and High Visibility Violence
In two distinct but complementary moves, the Far Right and, increasingly, mainstream
conservatism have embraced its own version of suspicious hermeneutics and have embraced high
visibility displays of political violence. These two often form a vicious circle: domestic terrorists
often embrace conspiracy theories to justify their actions, and conservative politicians equivocate
on rather clear causes and motivations behind these acts. These two together constitute what Moi
calls the “difficulty of reality,” a term from Cora Diamond describing “something we can’t
express in words,” something that one experiences but finds difficult to put into adequate
descriptive language (Revolution 232).
Moi’s response to this difficulty is to cultivate a “just and loving gaze” that attempts to
accurately describe reality, to “see the world as it is” (228). The act of writing is the putting into
words what one sees from this gaze and the invitation for others to see the same thing in the
same way (226). This commitment to accurate description is “an act of resistance” against
powerful persons and institutions that proliferate empty and equivocating language to confuse
and manipulate the public, even inciting people to acts of terrorism (242). Through close
attention to the particulars of language use and accurate descriptions of particular events and
practices, we might begin to undercut the difficulties of reality posed by doublespeak and by
unspeakable violence.
This attentive description is further able to cut against double assault on reality and
language by twenty-first century Far Right politics when it is aimed at the life of particular
places. It rejects the insistence upon depth-meanings by emphasizing the evident violence and
subjection enacted in one’s place, by taking seriously Wittgenstein’s argument that “nothing is
hidden” (Moi, “‘Nothing is Hidden’” 36). The subjection of particular people and particular
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places in neoliberal capitalism is not hidden to those who attend to their own place, as Berry’s
careful attention to Kentucky demonstrates. The attention to place–and the attention to others’
descriptions of their places–holds the possibility of undermining the deluge of talk emanating
from nowhere and speaking for everywhere. This commitment to realism can offer clear
descriptions of what is happening where and to whom, inviting people to look and see reality in
place of the unreality created by unchecked suspicion.
Furthermore, in connecting to and working alongside members of one’s place, one might
undermine the suspicion leveled against the Left by the Right. In the turn towards place, we
might make neighbors out of those who are paranoid of progressive aims. The turn towards place
and towards the ordinary offers an alternative to the asocial tendencies of suspicious critique. As
long as critics and English departments remain cloistered, we will struggle to endear ourselves to
communities whose only picture of our work is painted by the Charlie Kirks of the world. In an
ordinary placed reading, we might better formulate a vision for the progress of particular places,
enabling the university, and literature departments in particular, to be part of their place and
repair its relationship with its place.
In his ban on conventional critical practices for those reading his novel, Berry invites
literary critics and scholars into a new way of reading not just his work but literature and culture
more broadly. He invites us to consider what might happen if we rethink our commitment to
suspicion and the assumption that unmitigated suspicion is the key towards unworking social
inequities and ecological degradation that persist 150 years into suspicious hermeneutics. As we
reconsider the possibilities for reading, we might embody Berry’s own place-oriented ethic,
reading from a commitment to the ordinary networks and the life of particular natural-socialagricultural places, prioritizing the ways that the horizons of particular places intervene in the
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horizons of our own place and in the horizons of national and global discourses. This ordinary
placed reading, instead of limiting our critical freedom, might offer new questions and answers
from which to move beyond the limits of critique that so often prevent literature and critique
from meaning within the world. The work to undoing the dire problems of our day is, of course,
a massive task, but we must also consider the ways that our own places might prepare
themselves to live in the national and global systems we hope to recreate and what our own
communities need to respond to and resist the well-funded and well-oiled machines of
abstraction and homogenization. We might, with Berry, know our world from within our own
places, “find[ing it] still satisfyingly large and still full of beguiling nooks and crannies,” and
find a new freedom in attention to the ordinary (“Out of Your Car” 21).
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NOTES

1

Of course, disability, which profoundly reconfigures the “normal” natural body, can be the condition of possibility
that reconfigures the social practice. Until the practice is reconfigured, though, the person either does the task in a
different way or is excluded from the form of life.
2
This phrase will be my shorthand for a holistic understanding of particular geographic communities. “Natural”
encompasses wilderness and wildlife; “social” encompasses human-to-human community, including cultural,
political, economic, familial, etc. relations; “agricultural” primarily encompasses farming and ranching ecologies,
which include food and clothing production. Berry argues that “eating is an agricultural act” (“Pleasures of Eating”
143). And, I think he would agree, so is clothing oneself. However a town or city gets food is part of its agricultural
life; a lack or neglect for local agriculture is, of course, part of the agricultural dimension of a place. I acknowledge
how fraught each of these terms are; their complicated nature is meant to be fully imported into the analyses of
particular places. I acknowledge, further, that these are not parsed so easily: the natural and the agricultural are, of
course conditioned by the social, and the social is, to an extent, always bounded by the natural.
3
This also frees the critic from any need to construct a so-called ideal reader. Inasmuch as a critic is attentive to
their community’s concerns and the text’s concerns, they are ideal, meaning that they are responsible to work and
place, giving a voice that can stand alongside other voices as examples of responses, instead of seeking and
embodying a single ideal reader.
4
I do not wish to convey a simple, linear process. This process, as readers of difficult texts know, may frustrate and
confuse readers over many years, as a reader’s knowledge and concerns change or as they realize a long-held
thought about the text was wrong or shortsighted. This is much like the nature of adventures as it is: a simple hike in
the woods and, say, climbing the Seven Summits, while both adventures, vary greatly in duration and difficulty–one
might even fail in their adventure. The adventure of reading is much the same way.
5
Ricœur, fittingly, calls the act of interpretation “appropriation,” with its three senses of (1) understanding oneself,
(2) “overcoming [the] cultural distance” between reader and text, and (3) enacting the text in the reader’s own
discourse (“What is a Text?” 145-46).
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